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VEIL-PIERCING'S PROCEDURE

Sam F. Halabi*
Abstract
With the lines between shareholders and corporations blurring
over constitutional rights like free exercise of religion and political
speech, questions as to how and under what circumstances the law
respects or disregards the separation between shareholders and their
corporations have never been more urgent. In the corporate law
literature, these inquiries have overwhelmingly focused on the
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, a judicial mechanism normally
applied to hold shareholders responsible for the obligations of
corporations. The last twenty years of veil-piercing scholarship has
been largely devoted to empirical analyses of veil-piercing cases
collected from Lexis and Westlaw searches. Since 1991, scholars have
been trying to mine cases for ever more variables that might predict
when and under what circumstancesjudges disregardthe separation
between shareholdersand their corporations. This Article argues that
these scholars have focused on the substance of veil-piercinglaw to the
detriment of another factor: civil procedure. This Article is the first to
survey civil procedure and evidentiary rules that affect existing veilpiercing studies including pleading standards, threshold
presumptions, burdens of proof, jury access and waiver. The Article
ultimately argues that phenomena scholars now ascribe to the
"incoherence"of veil-piercing law are explicable in the context of veilpiercing'sproceduralfluidity.
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INTRODUCTION

After decades of invulnerability in state and federal courts,
tobacco firms in the 1990s and 2000s began to face increasing and
potentially catastrophic liability over claims that they had hidden the
risks of tobacco consumption (including risks to non-users),
manipulated nicotine levels in cigarettes, intentionally misled
consumers about the relative benefits of "light" cigarettes, and,
ultimately, imposed billions of dollars of health and other costs on
consumers, governments and insurers.1 This liability was even more
threatening at that time because the major tobacco firms were
integrated into diversified companies like Kraft, Nabisco, and B.A.T.
Industries.2 Directors and managers feared that successful plaintiffs
would not only bankrupt divisions dedicated to tobacco
manufacturing, promotion, and distribution, but might reach other
corporate assets held by consumer products, brand management, or
financial services units through the legal doctrine known generally
as "piercing the corporate veil."
Legal scholars weighing in on the tobacco firms' fate
overwhelmingly focused on the substantive law of veil-piercing and
advised the tobacco firms to house their tobacco businesses in
separate corporate entities. Doing so, they claimed, would protect
non-tobacco assets. Columbia's Harvey Goldschmidt opined that
formally separating tobacco-related businesses from food units would
make courts "more reluctant" to pierce the corporate veil.3 Stanford's
Joseph
Grundfest
agreed
noting
that
"absent anything
extraordinary", courts would not pierce if tobacco-related businesses
were spun off.4 Renowned veil-piercing treatise author Stephen
Presser argued that non-tobacco assets would be protected from
plaintiffs' claims as long as the firms made sure the tobacco
businesses were not "controlled" by a parent corporation and could
prove that they were not segregating the businesses to evade existing
liabilities.5
To be sure, tobacco firms took scholars' advice seriously. An
internal memorandum circulated after R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Holdings, Inc. was separated from Nabisco Group Holdings Corp. in
1999 ordered that every detail of corporate separateness be observed:

1. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.
2006) aff'd in part, vacated in part, 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009) and order clarified,
778 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2011).
2. See Michael Arndt, It Just Got Hotter in Kraft's Kitchen, Bus. Wk., Feb. 12,
2007, at 36 (discussing Altria's spin off of Kraft Foods Inc. in 2007).
3. National Law Journal,June 1994.
4. Id.
5. SCB Conference Call with Stephen Presser, May 24, 1999, available at
http://legacy.library.ucsf.eduitid/rmm09e00.
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It is critical that we not confuse third parties about which company
is acting in a particular situation. If the corporate separateness of
Holdings and Tobacco is not maintained, a court could treat the two
entities as one and permit a plaintiff in a tobacco lawsuit to pierce
6
the corporate veil and reach the parent company's assets.
But tobacco firms did not limit their efforts at asset protection to
restructuring their businesses or adopting veil-piercing deterrent
policies. They also played for the rules. In litigation across the
country, tobacco firms argued that they enjoyed evidentiary
presumptions, plaintiffs bore heightened burdens of proof, veilpiercing inquiries applied to procedural aspects of litigation with the
same force as underlying substantive claims, courts should reject
corporate separateness as a defendant's affirmative defense, and that
plaintiffs should not have access to a jury on veil-piercing claims. 7As
early as 1989, Philip Morris had developed a litigation manual on
intercorporate liability, which set out strategies for both substantive
and procedural claims against veil-piercing.8 Despite the importance
tobacco firms attached to procedural factors affecting veil-piercing,
legal scholars neglected them.
This article addresses those factors, arguing in essence that the
civil procedure of corporate veil-piercing has been marginalized by
advocates, scholars and judges alike. Indeed, in arguably the most
important case of the Supreme Court's 2014 term, Justice Alito
writing for the majority concluded that a "closely held" for-profit
corporation was a person for purposes of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act without defining how or why a corporation might be
considered "closely held."9 In a stinging dissent, Justice Ginsburg
pointed out the same problem, but limited her analysis to the
substantial
consequences
of giving
for-profit
corporations

6. Memorandum from McDara P. Folan III, Vice President and Deputy Gen.
Counsel and Sec'y, RJ Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., to Key Managers (Nov. 19,
1999) (emphasis omitted).
7. See BAT Industries, p.l.c. v. Delaware Superior Court, Cause No.18S00-9712OR-670 (Supreme Court of Indiana, Jan. 12, 1998); see also Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 536 A.2d 243 (1988); State v. Philip Morris, Inc., 686 N.Y.S.2d (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Dec. 23, 1998); R.J.R. Nabisco Holdings Corp.'s Memorandum in Support of Motion
in Limine to Exclude Certain Evidence, R.J.R. Nabisco Holdings, Corporations v.
Dunn, 657 N.E.2d 1220 (Ind. 1995).
8.

PHILIP MORRIS COMPANIES INC., LITIGATION MANUAL ON INTERCORPORATE

LIABILITY (April 1989), available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/cgf22dOO.
9. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); see also Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1135 (10th Cir. 2013) ("[Wle cannot see
why an individual operating for-profit retains Free Exercise protections but an
individual who incorporates--even as the sole shareholder-does not, even though he
engages in the exact same activities as before."); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Using
Reverse Veil Piercing to Vindicate the Free Exercise Rights of Incorporated Employers,
16 GREEN BAG 235 (2013).

2015]

VEIL-PIERCING'S PROCEDURE

1005

"personhood" under RFRA.10 To be sure, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc. was a veil-piercing case. Hobby Lobby's controlling
shareholders argued that they could not comply with certain
coverage mandates imposed by the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act "unless ... [they] personally direct[ed] the corporations to
do so."" Yet to both Alito and Ginsburg, the fundamental issue of
corporate separateness was masked behind a range of policy and
statutory considerations. Neither mentioned state veil-piercing law
nor even clarified the relationship between state-incorporated
entities and eligibility for federal religious freedom protections. If
they had done so, it would have exposed the unmanageable diversity
and complexity involved in separating corporations, their
shareholder, and their managers in the closely held context.
This Article explores the procedural diversity that characterizes
corporate veil-piercing, bringing to light the crucial role civil
procedure plays in veil-piercing adjudication and exposing
weaknesses in current veil-piercing studies. Influenced by Robert
Thompson's pathbreaking study of veil-piercing in state and federal
courts, veil-piercing scholars have since 1991 focused their research
on collections of reported and unreported cases, examining the
profiles of plaintiffs and defendants; the type of claim (e.g. tort or
contract) likeliest to prevail; the rate at which courts pierce; and the
relative importance of one factor or another in reaching veil-piercing
conclusions. 12 This undertaking is vast. In their 2010 study of
corporate veil piercing in federal courts, Christina Boyd and David
Hoffman noted that there were "hundreds" of articles on veil
piercing.13 When he revisited and refined Thompson's study, Peter
Oh described the regular use of scholars' veil-piercing research to

10. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Although the Court
attempts to cabin its language to closely held corporations, its logic extends to
corporations of any size, public or private.").
11. Brief for Respondents at *27, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d
1114, 1135 (10th Cir. 2013) (No. 13-354).
12. See, e.g., Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Contract-Centered Veil Piercing, 13
STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 121 (2007); Peter B. Oh, Veil-Piercing, 89 TEX. L. REV. 81
(2010); Lee C. Hodge & Andrew B. Sachs, Empirical Study, Piercingthe Mist: Bringing
the Thompson Study into the 1990s, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 347 (2008)
(analyzing 228 cases from 1986 to 1995); John H. Matheson, Why Courts Pierce: An
Empirical Study of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 7 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 1 (2010)
[hereinafter Why Courts Pierce]; Richmond McPherson & Nader Raja, Corporate
Justice: An Empirical Study of Piercing Rates and Factors Courts Consider When
Piercing the Corporate Veil, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 931, 940 (2010) (examining 236
cases from 1996 to 2005); Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An
Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991) [hereinafter Piercing the Corporate
Veil]; Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil Within Corporate Groups: Corporate
Shareholders as Mere Investors, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 379 (1999).
13. Christina L. Boyd & David A. Hoffman, Disputing Limited Liability, 104 Nw.
U. L. REV. 854, 854 (2010).
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shape judicial and legislative policy not only in the U.S. but around
the world. 14
Following Karl Llewellyn's admonition that "what substantive
law says should be means nothing except in terms of what procedure
says that you can make real," this article aims to shift the debate
away from its current focus on parties and substance, toward the
process of piercing the corporate veil.15 The reasons for doing so are
two-fold. First, while current empirical treatments attempt to assess
the wide range of factors affecting veil-piercing outcomes, they tend
to either deemphasize or entirely ignore procedural variables that
impact the success of veil-piercing claims. Neither state nor federal
procedure is uniform in how veil-piercing cases are adjudicated.
Pleading standards, for example, range from liberal notice to specific
or heightened pleading for veil-piercing actions. Despite the
recurrent mantra in the literature that veil-piercing is an "equitable"
doctrine, federal and state courts regularly submit the question of
whether to pierce the corporate veil to a jury and in at least 10 states
and the District of Columbia, claimants enjoy a fairly clear right to a
jury trial on that issue.16 Evidentiary standards and burdens also
vary. Some states apply a preponderance of the evidence standard
while others impose a clear-and-convincing burden.17 In some cases,
courts presume corporate -shareholder separation, requiring plaintiffs
to plead and prove elements sufficient for a finding of piercing the
corporate veil while others authorize or require the corporate veil to
be raised as an affirmative defense.18 As the question of whether a
corporation is separate from its owners or not metastasizes through
an increasing number of state and federal regulatory schemes, the
process by which corporations are handled by judges will require
more certainty and definition than now prevails. 19
Second, the focus on parties and substance of corporate veilpiercing distracts from the universe of other options available to
litigants to combine shareholders and corporations for a wide range
of reasons. In state jurisdictions where veil piercing faces substantial
procedural hurdles and/or no access to a jury, litigants resort to
alternative
claims including
enterprise
liability,
equitable
subordination, fraudulent conveyance, theories of agency, and
varieties of civil conspiracy claims to reach shareholders.2o Scholars,
of course, have long been aware of these alternatives but have not
14.

Peter B. Oh, Veil Piercing,89 TEX. L. REV. 81, 91 (2010).

15.

KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 17 (2012)

16. See discussion infra Part JV.B.
17. See supra note 12.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Amfac Foods, Inc. v. Int'l Sys. & Controls Corp., 654 P.2d 1092, 1098 (Or. 1982)
(listing alternative theories that might be pursued along with veil-piercing).
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systematically studied their use as the result of the options civil
procedure offers and shapes. These alternatives will similarly guide
relevant questions as to how shareholders may use the corporate veil
as a "sword" against creditor claims but a "shield" against regulatory
measures.
Assessing the influence of rules of civil procedure may help in
bringing clarity to curiosities that have emerged from aggregate
analyses. Maryland courts, known for their hostility to veil-piercing,
work under rules which disallow veil-piercing as an independent
cause of action, generally provide no access to a jury's determination
for veil-piercing claims, and require a plaintiff to meet a clear-andconvincing standard of proof.21 North Dakota courts, which oversee
one of the highest veil-piercing rates, apply liberal notice pleading to
veil-piercing claims and subject them only to a preponderance of the
evidence burden. Existing narratives attribute the difference
between Maryland and North Dakota to the relative importance of
"fraud" and "undercapitalization" as factors courts weigh in piercing

the corporate

veil.22

The purpose of this Article is to identify and draw focus to the
analytical difficulties implicit in empirical studies of veil piercing
that have not yet been adequately addressed. Experimental
statistical treatments of cases culled from larger data sets obtained
through using search terms in Westlaw and Lexis seek to affirm or
negate certain expectations through correlations between variables.
The classic case in the veil-piercing literature is the contract/tort
distinction. Before Thompson's study, scholars generally agreed that
veil-piercing was easier in tort actions with the plausible explanation
that tort creditors were less able to protect themselves from abusive
uses of the limited liability business entity.23 Thompson's study
upended the conventional wisdom, demonstrating, at least according
to the methodology he applied, that contract actions were more likely
to result in a veil-piercing outcome.24 Peter Oh's 2010 study
suggested a return to the conventional wisdom favoring tort actions
by carefully categorizing actions for fraud, again based on whether a
plaintiff successfully reached shareholder assets.25 Correlation, of
course, is not causation and these and other studies depend on
whether any given researcher has correctly identified the relevant
phenomena and controlled for alternative possibilities. The most
21. JAMES J. HANKS, JR., § 4.18 PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL "A HERCULEAN
TASK" MDCLW (2013).
22. Oh, supranote 14, at 118.
23.

2 PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG ET AL., BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS

§

57.04, 57-

8, (2nd ed. 2009); Stephen Presser, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL, §1:7 (2010).
24. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1058 (1991).
25. Oh, supranote 14.
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prominent studies of veil piercing focus on whether the veil is pierced
in various contexts e.g. contract, tort, closely held corporations, in a
dispositive or discovery motion; upon a central veil-piercing theory
e.g. undercapitalization, commingling of funds, or failure to observe
corporate formalities; and, applying a certain state's law. Scholars
have paid significantly less attention to how the veil is pierced.
Part I of this Article provides a brief summary of the law of veilpiercing and surveys the existing literature beginning with Robert
Thompson's 1991 article. This section of the Article demonstrates the
general tendency of empirical veil-piercing work to neglect
procedural variables. Parts II and III survey, respectively, state and
federal rules of civil procedure and evidence for factors which
influence the course of a veil-piercing claim: 1) must plaintiffs bring
an independent cause of action for piercing the corporate veil or is it
a remedy for an underlying action? 2) if not specifically pled before
trial, is the claim waived? 3) if not waived, do the rules of civil
procedure or evidence nevertheless encourage or discourage veilpiercing plaintiffs to bring those claims toward the beginning of
litigation? 4) which burden of proof must a litigant meet to prevail on
veil-piercing claim or defense? 5) who determines whether the
corporate veil will be pierced, the judge or the jury? Part IV uses the
procedural variables explored in Parts II and III to explain both why
current empirical treatments of veil-piercing tell us less than they
might while simultaneously suggesting that some of the curiosities in
those studies may be understood as a function of the paths civil
procedure shapes for veil-piercing claimants. In Part V, I argue that,
without accounting for procedural variables, existing empirical
studies tell us little about either litigant or judicial behavior relevant
to veil-piercing disputes.
I. VEIL-PIERCING: AN OVERVIEW
When general corporation codes replaced the special state
legislative charters that characterized the limited liability entities of
the 1800s, corporations shifted in the American economic, legal, and
political landscape from unusual - and highly circumscribed - beings
created by the state to pedestrian entities with increasingly equal
rights to natural persons.26 In recent years, this trend has
accelerated as the U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts have
extended their rights - like political expression and free exercise of
religion - normally ascribed to natural persons. 27 As a corollary to
26. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 171-72 (3d ed. 2005).
27. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (rejecting
generally any difference between natural persons and corporations for purposes of
First Amendment political speech protection); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius,
723 F.3d 1114, 1135 (10th Cir. 2013) (ruling that a private for-profit corporation could
bring a claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act),
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their distinctness and independence, corporations' legal existence
stands separate and apart from the shareholders of the corporation,
who in exchange for investment of their capital face limited
consequences for corporate debts and liabilities. "The purpose of such
separation is to insulate the stockholders from the liabilities of the
corporation, thus limiting their liability to only the amount that ...
[they] voluntarily put at risk."28 This "limited liability ... promote[s]
commerce and industrial growth by encouraging shareholders to
make capital contributions to corporations without subjecting all
their personal wealth to the risks of the business."29 The separation
between shareholders and corporations has facilitated some of the
most important features of modern capitalism: efficient stock
markets for the trading of ownership interests; diversification of
investment risk; subsidized risk-taking by corporate managers; and,
most importantly, enhanced capital flows to entrepreneurs. o
The benefits flowing from the separation of shareholders and
their corporations are accompanied by significant costs, the
management of which remain contested among legal scholars.31 The
separation of ownership and control empowers corporate managers to
act in their own interests at the expense of not only shareholders but
other constituencies like employees, communities, consumers,
suppliers and other creditors.32 The extent and management of those
costs manifest differently between corporations whose shares are
publicly traded (and therefore are subject to at least some level of
market discipline) and those whose shares are closely held, often
partially or wholly re-uniting ownership and control in the same
persons or entities. Indeed, it is the principle of control which
undergirds the doctrine of veil-piercing, which courts have, so far,
only applied to closely held corporations.33
28. Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
29. David H. Barber, Piercingthe Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 371, 371
(1981) (citing N. LATrIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 11-12 (2d ed. 1971)).
30.

ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE

PROPERTY (1932); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: a Review of Theory and
Empirical Work, 25 J. OF FIN. 383 (1970).
31. See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1925 (1991); David
Million, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the Limits of
Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1307 (2007) ("[Llimited liability should not
provide the occasion for shareholders to behave opportunistically toward third
parties."); Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in
CorporationLaw, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 148-49 (1980).
32. Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL

1860 85-92 (1954); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are CorporateManagers Trustees?,
45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
33. Thompson, Piercingthe Corporate Veil, supra note 12, at 1047.
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Simply stated, veil-piercing allows courts to disregard the
artificial "veil" separating shareholders and corporations and allows
a litigant to treat them as one for a range of reasons, the most
common of which is the pool of assets available to satisfy legal
liabilities.34 In the archetypal case, a shareholder, acting as a
director, a manager, or other ostensibly authorized agent of the
corporation, will enter into a contract or commit a civil wrong
attributable to the corporation. A creditor (either contract or tort)
will seek to recover from both the shareholder and the corporation
nominally responsible for the liability.
Veil-piercing, of course, is not the only legal theory under which
shareholders and corporations may be unified for legal purposes.
Depending on factual context and procedural background, plaintiffs
may pursue theories of agency, aiding and abetting, a menu of
equitable doctrines, civil conspiracy, enterprise liability, fraudulent
conveyance, or violation of statutory duties that effectively erase
distinctions between regulation-violating, contract-breaching, and
tort-perpetrating
participants.35 This in part explains the
jurisprudential and scholarly frustration with the law of veilpiercing. 36 Early courts borrowed concepts from agency law, applying
the "alter ego" or "mere instrumentality" tests when determining if
the corporate form should be disregarded. 37 The core of veil-piercing
law is actually remarkably uniform across jurisdictions, requiring
that a court find variations on "complete control and domination
[and]... a shareholder perpetuat[ing] a fraud, wrong, or injustice
that has proximately caused unjust loss or injury to the plaintiff." 3s
Jurisdictions have, to the consternation of judges, legislators and
scholars alike, expanded the factors to be considered for both the first
"control" prong and the second "wrong" prong, while some
jurisdictions have unevenly or completely failed to apply causation as

34. 1. Maurice Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 COLUM. L. REV.
496, 496-99 (1912).
35. See Equity Trust Co. Custodian FBO Eisenmenger IRA v. Cole, 766 N.W.2d
334, 337 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (plaintiff investors alleged alter ego theory to hold
defendants liable individually for claims surrounding several claims, among these
included "breach of ...fiduciary dut[ies], breach of contract, intentional and negligent
misrepresentation, [and] civil theft").
36. Amfac Foods, Inc. v. Int'l Sys. & Controls Corp., 654 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Or. 1982)
(noting that inconsistent and vague standards for piercing the corporate veil "has
troubled judges and lawyers for a century or so").
37. The Fifth Circuit, offering some colorful examples of "mere instrumentalities,"
which include: "[a]n adjunct, creature, device, stooge, or dummy." Edwards Co. v.
Monogram Indus., 700 F.2d 994, 1000 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Milwaukee
Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 253 (E.D. Wis. 1905) (describing a firm as the
"alter ego" of a "dummy" corporation); Advanced Const. Corp. v. Pilecki, 901 A.2d 189,
196 (Me. 2006) (applying law of agency to find shareholder liable for corporate debt).
38. Oh, supra note 12, at 84.
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a requirement. 39
Because of these divergences and incongruities, the literature
addressing veil-piercing is humorously indignant. Frank Easterbook
and Daniel Fischel quipped that .'[pliercing' seems to happen
freakishly. Like lightning, it is rare, severe, and unprincipled. "40
David Millon described veil-piercing as "incoherent."41 Stephen
Presser recalls early scholars who declared veil-piercing was "vague
and illusory" and a "legal quagmire."42 Judicial opinions echo the
scholarly sentiment.43 Legal scholars have advocated its abolition, its
statutory codification, and even a return to its arguable origin as a
purely equitable remedy.44
The criticism is sweeping and, frankly, unfair. Judges
adjudicating veil-piercing claims clearly do so with regard for the
important policy rationales underlying the separation between
shareholders and corporations.45 Yet the doctrine itself implicates
both judges' duty to adhere to legislative mandates to respect the
corporate veil and their more regular role in shepherding civil
disputes. Veil-piercing survived the major revolutions in federal and

39. See, e.g., Baatz v. Arrow Bar, 452 N.W.2d 138, 141 (S.D. 1990) (including
within the court's inquiry "1) fraudulent representation by corporation directors; 2)
undercapitalization; 3) failure to observe corporate formalities; 4) absence of corporate
records; 5) payment by the corporation of individual obligations; or 6) use of the
corporation to promote fraud, injustice, or illegalities."); Mesler v. Bragg Mgmt. Co.,
702 P.2d 601, 606 (Cal. 1985) ("There are, nevertheless, two general requirements: '(1)
that there be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of
the corporation and the individual no longer exist and (2) that, if the acts are treated
as those of the corporation alone, an inequitable result will follow."') (quoting
Automotriz v. Resnick, 306 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1957). Other jurisdictions do not require
proof of the third element.
40. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation,52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 89 (1985).
41. David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the
Limits of Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1381 (2007).
42. Presser, supra note 23, at 9.
43. Amfac Foods, Inc. v. Int'l Sys. & Controls Corp., 654 P.2d 1092, 1097 (1982)
("[Miany judicial opinions contain alluring but largely unhelpful rhetorical devices
which purport to state a rule, but generally state merely a result.").
44. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479 (2001);
John H. Matheson & Raymond B. Eby, The Doctrine of Piercing the Veil in an Era of
Multiple Limited Liability Entities: An Opportunity to Codify the Test for Waiving
Owners' Limited-Liability Protection, 75 WASH. L. REV. 147 (2000); Peter Oh, VeilPiercing Unbound, 93 B.U. L. REV. 89 (2013) [hereinafter Oh, Veil-Piercing Unbound].
45. Johnson v. Exclusive Props. Unlimited, 720 A.2d 568, 571 n.2 (Me. 1998) ("The
decision to pierce the corporate veil involves a determination of 'whether-considering
the totality of the evidence-the policy behind the presumption of corporate
independence
and limited shareholder liability-encouragement
of business
development-is outweighed by the policy justifying disregarding the corporate form-the
need to protect those who deal with the corporation."') (quoting Wm.Passalacqua
Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers South, Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1991)).
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state civil procedure as an equitable doctrine with features of an
independent cause of action. As an equitable doctrine it should be
available only where there is no adequate remedy at law, but it often
accompanies legal claims resolved by juries. Closely identified with
fraud, veil-piercing lends itself to the heightened standards of
pleading demanded by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
many state procedural systems, the latter of which also regularly
enhance evidentiary burdens for fraud claims.46 Within this
procedural context, judges balance legislative admonitions to
separation with their own
safeguard corporate-shareholder
institutional interests in protecting equitable powers as well as
equally potent constitutional norms favoring jury determinations of
fact.47
A. Analytical Foci of Current Studies
While scholarly attention to veil-piercing long pre-dated Robert
Thompson's path-breaking veil-piercing study, his was the first to
systematically collect instances where courts applied the doctrine,
distribute those instances into discrete categories, and draw
conclusions based on aggregate data, although he urged care in the
use of those conclusions for any firm policy or jurisprudential
decision-making.48 Some of Thompson's findings dovetailed with the
observations and expectations of corporate law commentators. For
example, courts pierced only against closely held corporations and
never against publicly traded corporations; pierced more against
individual shareholders than collective groups of shareholders; and,
government plaintiffs succeeded in veil-piercing claims more readily
than private parties.49 Other findings challenged the conventional
wisdom, especially the differences between successful actions in
contract versus tort (42% to 31% respectively) and the greater
likelihood that the assets of individual, rather than corporate,

46. See Presser, supranote 23, at 10.
47. See, e.g., Wm. Passalacqua Builders South, Inc. v. Resnick Developers South,
Inc, 933 F.2d 131, 134-135 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Moreover, as a practical matter separate
from Seventh Amendment considerations, whether or not those factors-discussed
later in our analysis-that will justify ignoring the corporate form and imposing
liability on affiliated corporations or shareholders are present in a given case is the
sort of determination usually made by a jury because it is so fact specific."); Baldwin
Cnty. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Chancellor Land Co., 533 So. 2d 217, 219 (Ala. 1988)
(stating that whether one is the alter ego of another is a question of fact for the jury);
Allman Hubble Tugboat Co. v. Reliance Dev. Corp., et al., 74 P.2d 985, 987 (Wash.
1938) ("[T]he jury had a right to find that the Reliance Development Corporation was
not organized in good faith, and that it was a mere shell or form to protect the
appellants from liability .... ").
48. See Thompson, Piercingthe Corporate Veil: An EmpiricalStudy, supra note 12,
at 1046.
49. Id. at 1055-57.
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shareholders would be reached.50
Thompson's study exercised an enormous influence over not only
policy and jurisprudential decision-making, but scholars' approach to
veil-piercing research. After 1991, scholars, including Thompson
himself, began assembling larger collections of cases to determine
which veil-piercing factors courts based their decisions on most
frequently, which state laws were most and least friendly to veilpiercing, and whether a certain kind of party (e.g. individual or
corporate) enjoyed greater success.51 Thompson updated his findings
in 1995, adding 2200 cases, slightly modifying his categories but
ultimately determining that "the recent data indicates that these
results fit within the pattern of the original study."52 John Matheson
applied a multiple logistic regression analysis to a smaller collection
of cases, determining that Thompson's conclusions, inter alia,
understated courts' preferences for (1) piercing to reach individual
rather than corporate shareholders and, (2) finding in favor of
corporate (or entity) plaintiffs far more than individual plaintiffs.53
Matheson analyzed cases covering a longer time span, but ultimately
examined far fewer cases because he excluded cases that "1) failed to
reach the merits of the piercing issue; 2) had a statutory basis for
piercing; 3) pierced to gain jurisdiction over a party; 4) constituted
horizontal piercing; or 5) constituted reverse piercing."54 Several
additional studies aimed at revising or updating Thompson's
methodology specifically.55 Others examined only one veil-piercing
factor or issue-area for which courts had used veil-piercing. John
Swain and Edwin Aguilar, for example, collected cases specific to the
use of veil-piercing to exercise personal jurisdiction over affiliate
corporations.56
In 2010, Christina Boyd and David Hoffman published their
analysis of veil-piercing, focusing not on the ultimate conclusions of
state and federal courts, but rather examining the dockets of federal
district courts between 2000 and 2005 and including veil-piercing
arguments raised in
50. Id. at 1058.
51. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil Within Corporate Groups: Corporate
Shareholders as Mere Investors, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 379, 380, 385-87, 392 (1999).
52. Id. at 385.
53. John H. Matheson, Why Courts Pierce: An Empirical Study of Piercing the
Corporate Veil, 7 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 1, 4, 14-15 (2009).
54. Id. at 10 n.30.
55. See, e.g., Hodge & Sachs, supra note 12, at 347, 349-50 (analyzing 483 cases
out of 2,901 which "show[ed] an increasing reluctance of courts to pierce the corporate
veil"); McPherson & Raja, supra note 12, at 940 (analyzing every sixth case
chronologically to create a sample of 638 cases).
56. John A. Swain & Edwin E. Aguilar, Piercing the Veil to Assert Personal
Jurisdictionover CorporateAffiliates: An Empirical Study of the Cannon Doctrine, 84
B.U. L. REV. 445, 449-50 (2004).
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preliminary motion practice, during discovery, at summary
judgment, at trial, or in post-trial practice. [They] also analyzed the
significant non-veil piercing motion practice in each case as a
control. The resulting database consists of a set of observations
which speak to the life of veil piercing law, rather than the gauzy
rationalizations presented by judges' written opinions.57
Boyd and Hoffman also coded for factors like judicial
characteristics and ideology.58 While their article uniquely assessed
the relevance of legal and non-legal factors (e.g. defendant's size and
judicial ideology), other determinations supported previous empirical
work including the association of undercapitalization and contract
actions with veil-piercing success. 59 Most recently, Peter Oh revisited
Thompson's methodology aiming at explaining the counterintuitive
outcomes for veil-piercing actions in contract or tort (or, more
flexibly, voluntary versus involuntary creditor claims).60 Claiming to
have assembled "the most comprehensive portrait of veil-piercing
decisions yet," Oh examined the presence and context of fraud as a
veil-piercing ground, finding not only that tort-based veil-piercing
claims succeed at a higher rate than contract claims, but that this
tort success obtained even without accounting for fraud and in
Thompson's original timeframe.61
B. TheNeglect of ProceduralVariables
Scholars are certainly aware that the civil procedure of veilpiercing matters, even if they do not necessarily account for the
procedural diversity that characterizes veil-piercing claims.
Arguably, Boyd's and Hoffman's most important contribution is that
they examined entire dockets, conscious that veil-piercing disputes
arise in "fighting off a defendant's motion to dismiss veil piercing
allegations; obtaining veil piercing-related discovery from a
shareholder; keeping a case in federal court on the ground that two
purportedly different parties might really be one; and, most
importantly, surviving summary judgment."62 Similarly, Peter Oh's
greatest contribution to the current debate may be his focus on the
issue of fraud and how its use as a contract or tort theory in litigation
may affect aggregate outcomes.63 John Matheson's 2009 study
focused on the (growing) list of factors courts consider when deciding
whether to pierce the corporate veil-commingling of funds,
undercapitalization, failure to observe formalities, and others-and
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Boyd & Hoffman, supra note 13, at 856.
Id. at 857.
Id. at 862.
See Oh, supra note 14, at 137-40.
Id. at 81.
Boyd & Hoffman, supra note 13, at 864.
Oh, supra note 14, at 89.
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which of those effectively signaled likely success for veil-piercing
plaintiffs.64
Yet for this awareness, civil procedure remains curiously
sidelined. Boyd's and Hoffman's analysis is limited to data obtained
from federal court litigation between 2000 and 2005, so the
conclusions they draw apply to the roughly 30% of veil piercing cases
adjudicated in federal courts.65 The vast majority of veil-piercing
cases, of course, are handled by state judges under state rules of civil
procedure.66 Even within their data set, litigation in federal court is
impliedly uniform when the reality is far different.67 Federal district
courts sitting in diversity, for example, have applied a range of
pleading standards to veil-piercing cases, even before the U.S.
Supreme Court's decisions and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,68 and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,69 significantly complicated the pleading standards
picture. District courts sitting in the Seventh Circuit are bound to
apply that court's decision that veil-piercing claims are not covered
by the Seventh Amendment while district courts in the Second
Circuit must give claimants a right to a jury trial on veil-piercing
claims.70
While almost certainly influencing the commencement, course
and resolution of veil-piercing claims, these variables disappear in
current analyses with no obvious effort to identify them or variables
that might serve as proxies. John Matheson, for example, only
examined cases where a court reached the merits of a veil-piercing
claim, thus including cases from jurisdictions where veil-piercing
may or must be brought along with related claims, but excluding
cases where a claimant must exhaust other legal theories like breach
of fiduciary duty. 71 Peter Oh is to be credited with emphasizing the
role of fraud in veil-piercing cases, but without assessing evidentiary
standards under which fraud is adjudicated by triers of fact, his
insight may tell us little about veil-piercing and more about the
relative ease of bringing fraud actions in different jurisdictions. He
64. See Matheson, Why Courts Pierce, supra note 12, at 1-5.
65. Boyd & Hoffman, supra note 13, at 877.
66. Oh, supra note 14, at 113.
67. Boyd & Hoffman, supra note 13, at 878 n.121.
68. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
69. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
70. Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers South, Inc., 933 F.2d
131, 134-135 (2d Cir. 1991); Int'l Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Chromas Techs. Canada, Inc., 356
F.3d 731, 737 (7th Cir. 2004) (conceding that if a jury makes a factual determination
relevant to a veil-piercing analysis, the district court judge would be bound by that
factual determination).
71. See John H. Matheson, The Modern Law of Corporate Groups: An Empirical
Study of Piercingthe Corporate Veil in the Parent-SubsidiaryContext, 87 N.C. L. REV.
1091 (2009) (examining 360 parent-subsidiary cases from January 1, 1990 to March 1,
2008).
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further assumes that "veil-piercing is a remedial instrument for
satisfying a judgment that stands apart from a matter's substantive
cause(s) of action" but in the many jurisdictions that require or goad
plaintiffs to bring veil-piercing actions early in litigation, veilpiercing shapes the entire dispute and, in fact, may play a role in
settlement that Thompson, Oh, Boyd, and Hoffman concede
challenges any empirical analysis of veil-piercing to date.72

II. VEIL-PIERCING AND THE RELEVANCE

OF PROCEDURE

Because of the questions they ask, scholars tend to ascribe to
veil-piercing a kind of procedural homogeneity. In the typical
depiction, veil-piercing is an "equitable remedy" exercised by a judge
at the end of litigation when a judgment for a corporate creditor
remains unsatisfied and the relative involvement of one or more
shareholders in the underlying contract breach or tort is assessed
under a presumably uniform although unstated burden of proof. It is
unsurprising, then, that when it is studied with these legal priors
implicitly or explicitly informing the inquiry, it appears
unpredictable and incoherent.
The reality is that veil-piercing claims run the gamut from freestanding causes of action (which under the law of waiver in some
jurisdictions must be pleaded early in litigation) to affirmative
defenses to, indeed, equitable remedies enforced at the end of
litigation. Those claims or the claims to which they are tied are
subject to burdens of proof ranging from preponderance of the
evidence to clear-and-convincing evidence, which may or may not, in
turn, be a proper subject for accepting expert testimony. State
jurisdictions have developed separate causes of action applicable to
individual versus corporate defendants in veil-piercing cases. Many
jurisdictions place the decision as to veil-piercing in the hands of the
jury, not the judge, inevitably influencing a number of factors,

72. Oh, supra note 14, at 106. It is worth noting that Jonathan R. Macey and
Joshua Mitts have recently published a study analyzing 9,380 veil-piercing decisions
and propose a new taxonomy for veil-piercing studies based on the policy rationales
courts are "really" applying. As with other studies, Macey and Mitts do not analyze the
confounding effects rules of civil procedure play, although they are attentive to certain
discrepancies caused by, for example, an effort to pierce the corporate veil for
jurisdictional rather than judgment satisfaction purposes. Although they situate their
study in previous efforts like Thompson's, Oh's, and Matheson's, their project is
different. Their textual analysis necessarily excludes many of the variables considered
in previous studies and, relatedly, takes what judges say in written opinions more
seriously. In other words, Boyd & Hoffman, Thompson, Oh, and Matheson are
skeptical about the relationship between what judges say and veil-piercing outcomes. I
am less skeptical but believe what they say is shaped by the procedural systems in
which they operate. Macey and Mitts conclude that what they say matters a great
deal. See Jonathan Macey & Joshua Mitts, Finding Order in the Morass: The Three
Real Justificationsfor Piercingthe Corporate Veil, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 99 (2014).
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including predisposition toward settlement.73 These nuances leach
into federal district courts through the obligations imposed by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, effectively
requiring federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction to apply both
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) and substantive state
law.74 The procedure/substance dichotomy spawned by Erie and its
progeny poses problems for the conclusions advanced in the existing
veil-piercing literature, even studies as careful and comprehensive as
Boyd's and Hoffman's.
A. Veil-Piercingas Pleadingand Presumption
1. Veil-Piercing as Cause of Action or Affirmative Defense
It is fitting that as a judicial device to allocate the risk society
bears for its grant of limited liability to entrepreneurs, it is equally
plausible that plaintiffs and defendants might bear the initial burden
of proving or disproving the corporate integrity limited liability
demands. In other words, it makes as much sense to require that
defendants plead and prove their adherence to state incorporation
requirements as an affirmative defense to shareholder liability as to
require creditor plaintiffs to bear the burden of pleading and proving
each element of a claim that shareholder defendants have failed to so
perform. In a famous essay on this choice, Edward Cleary identified
three general criteria courts use: policy, fairness, and probability.75
As a condition of obtaining limited liability, corporations must
file a certificate of incorporation with state agencies, typically the
secretary of state,76 providing potential veil-piercing claimants with a
substantial amount of inexpensive information as to shareholders
and interested parties. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1, although
aimed primarily at judicial integrity, requires corporate parties to
identify parent corporations and imposes an ongoing obligation to
inform the court of changes, allowing veil-piercing litigants' attorneys
to expand their investigations into broader corporate families.77 Some
states have adopted mirror provisions of FRCP 7.1.78 Moreover, at
least for contract creditors, shareholders are frequently required to
personally guarantee the performance of business obligations;

73. See e.g. Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An
EmpiricalPerspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849, 852 (1998).
74. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
75. Edward W. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading:An Essay on Juristic Immaturity,
12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 11-13 (1959).
76. M. Thomas Arnold, Administrative Aspects of State Corporation Law, 28 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1, 6, 19 (1994).
77.

FED. R. CIV. P. 7.1.

78. MONT. R. CIV. P. 7.1; NEV. R. CIV. P. 7.1; D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 7.1; MASS.
SUP. JUD. CT. RULE 1:2 1.
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especially debt.79 State legislatures are fairly uniform in their
statements that judges keep shareholders and the corporations they
own legally separate, and some affirmatively excuse the failure to
observe corporate formalities for adjudicating questions regarding
corporation/shareholder separation.o Policy and fairness rationales
therefore counsel that plaintiffs bear an initial burden to plead and
prove claims asserting that shareholders and corporate entities be
united for certain legal purposes.
On the other hand, outside the formal filing requirements, state
statutes impose on corporations annual meeting requirements (or
decision-making alternatives that require notice and written
evidence), annual filing statements that vary in level of detail, and
running obligations to make books and records available for
shareholder inspection.S1 Because these obligations appear to be part
of the grand bargain for limited liability, a "probabilistic" inquiry
suggests that most corporations observe these and other corporate
formalities most of the time. Shareholders, especially controlling
shareholders, might be justifiably expected to bear the initial burden
of pleading and proving incorporation and related practices as an
affirmative defense.
Indeed, divergence in state procedure manifests along not only
the plaintiffs' and defendants' initial burdens but along other axes
that effectively shift the pleading and presumption burdens between
movants and opponents of veil-piercing actions.82 In Louisiana's First
Circuit, for example, a shareholder may assert the corporate shield
as a defense to liability, but in doing so bears the initial burden of
proving the existence of the corporation and may carry this burden
by the use of corporate charter or other documents.83 If the
shareholder is successful, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the corporate form

79.

See Daniel R. Kahan, Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts: A Historical

Perspective, 97 GEO. L.J. 1085, 1089 n.12 (2009) (citing F. HODGE O'NEAL, CLOSE

CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE 40 n.11 (1958)) (noting that 'incorporation does not
often provide limited liability' for the close corporation's shareholders because
prospective lenders often require, as condition to allowing the corporation to borrow,
that shareholders assume personal liability for the debt)").
80. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.1835 (2013) ("The failure of a statutory close
corporation to observe usual corporate formalities or requirements relating to the
exercise of its corporate powers or the management of its business and affairs is not
grounds for imposing personal liability on the shareholders for obligations of the
corporation.").
81. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2009) (annual meeting); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 156D, § 7.20 (2004) (information for shareholders); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 220 (2010) (same).
82. See, e.g., Krause v. Great Lakes Holdings, Inc., 563 A.2d 1182, 1191 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1989); Carruthers v. Flaum, 365 F. Supp. 2d 448, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
83. McDonough Marine Serv. v. Doucet, 694 So. 2d 305, 309 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
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should be disregarded.84 Similarly, a corporate veil defense has been
raised in Idaho,85 Ohio,86 and Texas87 and allowed as a possibility in
Utah.ss The allocation of an initial pleading burden may depend on
the nature of the dispute and whether a governmental or nongovernmental party is involved. 89
2. Legal Claim or Equitable Remedy
Similarly, parties urging a court to disregard the veil between
the corporation and its shareholders may be required to raise the
issue early in the litigation or have it deemed waived or precluded;
other jurisdictions may allow or require a prevailing party to request
that judges exercise their equitable powers to grant relief,
presumably doing so because there is no adequate remedy at law.
This dichotomy is complicated further in jurisdictions that either
maintain the division between courts of equity and law or where
their merger is incomplete. Analysts frequently assume that veilpiercing occurs at the end of prior litigation, as an "equitable remedy"
applied when liability for a contract, tort or other action has been
established. Peter Oh, for example, citing a 1992 Texas appellate
court decision, writes that "veil-piercing is a remedial instrument for
satisfying a judgment that stands apart from a matter's substantive
cause(s) of action; a veil-piercing request is thus among the last
things courts tend to hear within a dispute."90 There is no obvious
reason why this would even ordinarily be the case.
As with initial pleading burdens, the requirement that a party
bring a veil-piercing claim or the availability of veil-piercing as
strictly equitable relief is plausibly driven by a number of policy and
fairness considerations. Plaintiffs and their attorneys are often
aware or at little expense could become aware with the
commencement of litigation that ownership and control behind a
given dispute may involve a complex web of corporate and individual
parties. The general set of sanctions rules of civil procedure impose
84. See Cahn Elec. Appliance Co. v. Harper, 430 So. 2d 143, 145 (La. Ct. App.
1983).
85. See Wash. Fed. Sav. v. Van Engelen, 289 P.3d 50, 56 (Idaho 2012).
86. Galbreath v. Martin, No. 12AP-324, 2013 WL 151491, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan.
15, 2013).
87. See Bailey v. Fleming, No. 14-95-01470-CV, 1997 WL 634166, at *3 (Tex. App.
Oct. 16, 1997); Butler v. Joseph's Wine Shop, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. App.
1982).
88. Ottens v. McNeil, 239 P.3d 308, 320-21 (Utah Ct. App. 2010).
89. Ark. Bank & Trust Co. v. Douglass, 885 S.W.2d 863, 870 (Ark. 1994) (citing
Woodyard v. Ark. Diversified Ins. Co., 594 S.W.2d 13, 14-17 (Ark. 1980)).
90. Oh, supra note 14, at 106 (citing Kern v. Gleason, 840 S.W.2d 730, 736 (Tex.
App. 1992) ("The piercing of the corporate veil is not a separate cause of action . ...
The various doctrines for disregarding the corporate entity are only remedial, for they
only expand the potential sources of recovery.")).
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for failure to reasonably bring as many claims and parties together in
the same dispute should counsel toward a requirement that veilpiercing be pleaded early in litigation.91
Indeed, in some jurisdictions, veil-piercing elements must be
pled before trial or they are waived.92 In Lipp v. Bruce, the plaintiffs
did not assert a cause of action alleging facts which would support a
claim for piercing the corporate veil until responding to a motion for
summary judgment.93 The Michigan appellate court found that the
plaintiffs had waived any ground for such an assertion and were not
allowed to make a showing of the elements for piercing the corporate
veil.94 In Shockley v. Harry Sander Realty Co., the plaintiff filed its
action against the defendants before the limitations period had run
on the underlying liability claim and successfully obtained a
judgment.95 When the judgment remained unsatisfied after
execution, the plaintiff filed another lawsuit seeking to pierce the
corporate veil. In finding that the limitations period had passed on
the piercing claim, the Missouri Court of Appeals ruled that the
defendants should have joined the veil-piercing request with their
initial action.96
Many jurisdictions, it is true, have selected the alternative
course allowing judgment creditors to bring subsequent actions in
equity, although for varying reasons. 97 Some states which have
concluded that piercing the corporate veil is not an independent
cause of action9S have done so in reliance on § 41.10 of Fletcher's
Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations which states that standing

91. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a), counterclaims that arise out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim
and do not raise jurisdictional problems are waived if not raised. See Tax Track Sys.
Corp. v, New Investor World, Inc., 478 F.3d 783, 786 (7th Cir. 2007).
92. See Endsley Elec., Inc. v. Altech, Inc., 378 S.W.3d 15, 22 (Tex. App. 2012) ("The
various theories for piercing the corporate veil must be specifically pled or they are
waived...") (citing Mapco, Inc. v. Carter, 817 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex. 1991); Seidler v.
Morgan, 277 S.W.3d 549, 557 (Tex. App. 2009); Town Hall Estates-Whitney, Inc. v.
Winters, 220 S.W.3d 71, 86 (Tex. App. 2007)); see also Vichi v. Koninklijke Philips
Electronics, No. CIV.A 2578-VCP, 2009 WL 4345724, at *20 (Del. Ch. Dec. 1, 2009) ("It
is settled Delaware law that a party waives a [veil-piercing] argument by not including
it in its brief.").
93. No. 270264, 2007 WL 2935027, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2007).
94. Seasword v. Hilti Inc., 537 N.W.2d 221, 224 (Mich. 1995); see also Kostopoulos
v. Crimmins, No. 299478, 2011 WL 6848354, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2011)
(concluding that veil-piercing is not a cause of action in Michigan).
95. 720 S.W.2d 418, 419-20 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
96. Id. at 421.
97. Thomas V. Harris, Washington's Doctrine of CorporateDisregard,56 WASH. L.
REV. 253, 263-67 (1981).
98. See Drury Dev. Corp. v. Found. Ins. Co., 668 S.E.2d 798, 801 (S.C. 2008);
Phillips v. United Heritage Corp., 319 S.W.3d 156, 158 (Tex. App. 2010).
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alone "[veil-piercing] creates no cause of action."99 Alabama, 100
Massachusetts, 101 and New York, for example, have explicitly
invoked Fletcher's treatise as authority for refusing to recognize veilpiercing as a cause of action separate from claims against the
corporation generally.102 Others locate the rationale squarely within
the procedural context, distinguishing the "substantive" law of the
related contract, tort or equitable action.103 Still others tie their
refusal to acknowledge an independent cause of action for veilpiercing as a function of the statutory demand for limited liability
prevailing over the less democratic but important equitable powers of
judges.104

Most jurisdictions, however, ascribe no firm or consistent
rationale, or allow veil-piercing claims to proceed as independent
causes of action without any discussion as to their substantive or
procedural origin.105 Clearly wrestling with the question as a matter
of Arizona law, a federal district court concluded that "[t]he Court
could not find an Arizona case specifically addressing whether an
alter ego claim is a separate and distinct cause of action that can
stand alone."106 The court noted that dicta from several Arizona cases

99. 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYC. OF THE LAW OF CORP. § 41.10
(2014).
100. See Ex. ParteThorn, 788 So.2d 140 (Ala. 2000); see also Thorne v. C & S Sales
Grp., 577 So.2d 1264, 1265-67 (Ala. 1991) (upholding a jury's determination that a
stockholder had used the corporation as an alter ego and holding the stockholder liable
for breach of contract); Baldwin Cnty. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Chancellor Land Co., 533
So.2d 217, 219 (Ala. 1988) (stating that whether one is the alter ego of another is a
"question of fact for the jury").
101. See e.g. Heimlich v. Friedfertig, No. 07-P-817, 2008 WL 4500221, at *1 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2008).
102. Matter of Morris v. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 623 N.E.2d 1157, 1160 (N.Y.
1993); Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Moskowitz, 297 A.D.2d 724, 725 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2002) ("The concept [of piercing the corporate veil] is equitable in nature and
assumes that the corporation itself is liable for the obligation sought to be imposed...
Thus, an attempt of a third party to pierce the corporate veil does not constitute a
cause of action independent of that against the corporation; rather it is an assertion of
facts and circumstances which will persuade the court to impose the corporate
obligation on its owners."' (citation omitted)).
103. Hennessey's Tavern, Inc. v. Am. Air Filter Co., 251 Cal. Rptr. 859, 865 (Ct.
App. 1988).
104. See Dixon v. Process Corp., 382 A.2d 893, 900 (Md. 1978) ("[T]here was no
fraud and. .. no paramount equity was present in the case sub judice which required
the intervention of equity's awesome powers.") (emphasis added).
105. See Lampkin v. Thrash, 81 So. 3d 1193, 1199 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012); Wolf v.
Walt, 530 N.W.2d 890, 895 (Neb. 1995) ("Wolf alleged four causes of action: conversion,
constructive fraud, breach of contract, and bailment. Wolf further alleged that Walt
operated Flat Top as a facade for his personal business enterprises and asked the
court for an order disregarding Flat Top's corporate identity.").
106. Five Points Hotel P'ship v. Pinsonneault, 835 F. Supp. 2d 753, 759 (D. Ariz.
2011).
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suggest that a party may bring a separate veil piercing claim.107 In
Sheffield Services Co. v. Trowbridge, the Colorado Court of Appeals
noted:
The complaint sufficiently identifies the transactions involved in
this case and states that "the individual defendants are named in
their individual capacities." It alleges that Trowbridge
"participated in the torts through direct involvement in the
wrongful conduct of the [LLCs], including specific authorization,
direction, active participation, or cooperation in the wrongful
conduct that is alleged in this complaint." It also alleges
Trowbridge engaged in wrongful transfers of distributions and
income he received from the LLCs to others despite the LLCs'
existing obligations to Sheffield. 108
The case implies not only that a veil-piercing action is an
independent claim, but, in that case, that it can be tried even without
being specifically pled. In Krause v. Great Lakes Holdings, Inc., the
Pennsylvania Superior Court explicitly acknowledged that,
depending on context, veil-piercing claims may constitute
independent causes of action or "amplifications" of prior actions
under Pennsylvania law. 109
Even jurisdictions that do not punish veil-piercing claimants for
failing to raise veil piercing in the initial action create procedural
loopholes by which they may circumvent the requirement to obtain a
prior judgment. By statute, piercing the corporate veil under Kansas
law is allowed in the limited circumstance where judgment has been
obtained against the corporation and the execution thereon is
unsatisfactory.11o However, Kansas courts have crafted an exception
to the statute where obtaining a prior judgment would be
impracticable.ii In doing so, the courts have created a quasi-

107. Id. (citing Chalpin v. Snyder, 207 P.3d 666, 670 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) ("The
trial court, however, allowed Reliance to take its claims of fraud and alter-ego to a
jury. Ultimately, Reliance did not request a jury instruction for its alter-ego claim.")
(emphasis added by the court)); GM Dev. Corp. v. Cmty. Am. Mortg. Corp., 795 P.2d
827, 835 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) ("In the case before us, the complaint contained four
counts . . . Count I alleged that [] was responsible for the debt owed by f and [
pursuant to an alter ego theory of liability ..
"). Contra Sandpiper Resorts Dev. Corp.
v. Global Realty Invs., LLC, No. 2:08-CV-01360JWS, 2012 WL 3234242, at *6 (D. Ariz.
Aug. 6, 2012) ("Piercing the corporate veil is not a stand alone legal claim.").
108. Sheffield Servs. Co. v. Trowbridge, 211 P.3d 714, 718 (Colo. App. 2009),
overruled by Weinstein v. Colborne Foodbotics, LLC, 302 P.3d 263 (Colo. 2013). Contra
Swinerton Builders v. Nassi, 272 P.3d 1174, 1177 (Colo. App. 2012) (concluding that
veil-piercing is not a separate and independent cause of action and that "[a] claimant
seeking to pierce the corporate veil must make a clear and convincing showing that
each of the foregoing factors has been satisfied.").
109. 563 A.2d 1182, 1191 (Pa. Super, Ct. 1989); see Mark C. Larson, Piercing the
Veil of Pennsylvania Limited Liability Companies, 75 PA. B. ASSN. Q. 124, 126 (2004).
110. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7101(b) (2009).
111. See Kilpatrick Bros., Inc. v. Poynter, 473 P.2d 33, 40 (Kan. 1970).

20151

VEIL-PIERCING'S PROCEDURE

1023

independent cause of action for veil-piercing which may accompany
other legal claims.
Thus, rules of civil procedure can be seen as exercising at least
three influences on when and how veil-piercing claims are
adjudicated. They may be specifically authorized as independent
causes of action which must be pled before trial along with related
claims or abandoned by virtue of statutes of limitations, waiver, or
res judicata. Veil-piercing may be authorized purely as an equitable
remedy unavailable until it is evident that there is no adequate
remedy at law, i.e., a previous judgment remains unsatisfied. 112
Finally, a veil-piercing claim may exist principally as a remedy but
with sufficient potential procedural sanctions so that litigants are
encouraged to bring the claim early in litigation.113 For example, in
Texas, where a post-judgment suit for veil-piercing is not typically
barred by res judicata, a subsequent suit may be precluded if prior
litigation resulted in the adjudication of a relevant material fact.114
So, even though veil-piercing is technically a remedy under Texas
law, 115 it is procedurally encouraged to be brought along with related
contract, tort and statutory claims.16 In other jurisdictions, the
process by which the division between actions at law or in equity was
maintained, merged or otherwise managed, influences the course of
veil-piercing claims. For example, in Delaware, veil-piercing must be
brought as an action in equity, so that a litigant who successfully
obtains an action at law must nevertheless turn to the chancery
courts for relief under a veil-piercing theory.117
3. Notice Versus Specific Pleading
Within the jurisdictions that either require or encourage veilpiercing claims to accompany other claims against corporations and
their shareholders, pleading standards vary in their stringency.118 At

112. Lane v. Mont. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, 68 P.3d 819, 824 (Mont. 2003)
(collecting cases in which veil piercing claims are not precluded because they are based
on satisfaction of a judgment).
113. For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 requires that parties be joined
who are necessary for the disposition of the dispute or whose interests may be
jeopardized if they do not participate. FED. R. CIV. P. 19. Many states have their own
versions of Rule 19 which in many cases will encourage parties to bring both
corporations and their shareholders into the dispute, implicating a veil-piercing
determination.
114. See Strange v. Estate of Lindemann, 408 S.W.3d 658 (Tex. App. 2013).
115. See Phillips v. United Heritage Corp., 319 S.W.3d 156, 158 (Tex. App. 2010).
116. Robert W. Hamilton et. al., 20 Tex. Prac., Business Organizations § 26.12 (2d
ed.).
117. See Sonne v. Sacks, 314 A.2d 194, 197 (Del. 1973).
118. See e.g., Discovery Techs., Inc. v. AvidCare Corp., 2005 WL 350438, at *4 (Wis.
Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2005) (upholding lower court's dismissal of complaint on the veil
piercing claim stating despite adoption of notice pleading, complaint failed to allege
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one end, and closely associated with jurisdictions that empirical
studies have assessed as liberal with respect to veil-piercing
outcomes, is simple notice pleading without specific or separate
allegations as to a veil-piercing or alter ego theory.119 In North
Dakota, for example, under the state's "liberal pleading rules,"
plaintiffs are not even required to plead with specificity the facts
supporting their claim or the factors considered in piercing the
corporate veil.120 In Indiana, a party may prevail on a veil-piercing
claim not raised in the pleadings but tried by express or implied
consent.121 Similarly, at least one Ohio jurisdiction effectively
adopted Wright & Miller's treatise standard for notice pleading even
in veil piercing claims:
the complaint, and other relief-claiming pleadings need not state
with precision all elements that give rise to a legal basis for
recovery as long as fair notice of the nature of the action is
provided. However, the complaint must contain either direct
allegations on every material point necessary to sustain a recovery
on any legal theory, even though it may not be the theory
suggested or intended by the pleader, or contain allegations from
which an inference fairly may be drawn that evidence on these
materialpoints will be introducedat trial.(emphasis in original).122
Thompson and Oh both assign Indiana and North Dakota law a
veil-piercing rate of greater than 60% and Ohio greater than 55%
without assessing the influence pleading standards may exercise.
Thompson notes the success of "conclusory" reasons courts offered
when deciding to pierce.123 As examples, he uses the number of times

sufficient factual basis to give individual defendant notice that he would be held
personally liable).
119. Garcia v. Coffman, 946 P.2d 216, 219 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) Petty v. Bank of
N.M. Holding Co., 787 P.2d 443, 445 (N.M. 1990) ("Under our rules of 'notice pleading,'
it is sufficient that defendants be given only a fair idea of the nature of the claim
asserted against them sufficient to apprise them of the general basis of the claim.");
See also Strong v. Hegarty, 1996 Mass. App. Div. 92 (Dist. Ct. 1996) ("A complaint
seeking to pierce the corporate veil must allege "facts sufficient to support" that
theory, but need not explicitly identify veil piercing as a theory for recovery.").
120. Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 565 (N.D. 1985).
121. A.B.C. Home & Real Estate Inspection, Inc. v. Plummer, 500 N.E.2d 1257,
1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (citing IND. R. TRIAL P. 15(B)).
122. Geier v. Nat'l GG Indus., Inc., No. 98-L-172, 1999 WL 1313640, at *4 (Ohio Ct.
App. Dec. 23, 1999) ("In both assignments, Wagner argues that because Geier did not
specifically set forth the "piercing the corporate veil" theory of liability in his
complaint, the court should not have permitted the theory of liability to be presented
to the jury. Secondly, he argues the issue was not tried by the implied consent of the
parties. Lastly, he claims that as a result of lack of notice that piercing the corporate
veil would be an issue at trial, his defense was unfairly prejudiced. Wagner's objections
are essentially procedural in nature." Id. at *3.).
123. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, supra note 12, at
1063.
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courts mention "instrumentality" and "alter ego" and their evident tie
to high veil piercing rates.124 Yet "conclusory" allegations are to some
extent what notice pleading jurisdictions allow. The predicted effect
would be a disproportionate number of cases from notice pleading
jurisdictions, a variable no current study assesses.
Other jurisdictions, especially those which closely tie veilpiercing to fraud, impose heightened pleading standards. In
Maryland, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to pierce the
corporate veil to redress fraud or "to protect a paramount equity." 125
Since no party has successfully brought a claim under the latter
theory, veil-piercing actions are essentially held to the heightened
pleading (and proof) standards Maryland courts require for fraud
actions.126 In New York, at the pleading stage, a plaintiff must set
forth "sufficiently [particularized] statements" showing that the
person or persons who are in control of the corporation "are actually
doing business in their individual capacities . . . ."127 As part of its
broad attempt to unify disparate practices in Oregon trial and
appellate courts, the Supreme Court of Oregon required any theory of
recovery, especially veil-piercing, to be separately and specifically
pleaded.128 In De La Fontaine Warehouses, Inc. v. Lang, a complaint
which alleged facts to support two veil-piercing factors was
insufficiently pled because it contained no facts to support a finding
that the corporation was used to commit fraud or that equity
required veil-piercing. 129
Indeed, even in the federal court system where the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure should theoretically smooth out pleading variation,
there is substantial divergence as to whether veil-piercing plaintiffs
must plead veil piercing or waive the right to raise those claims in
the litigation. Boyd and Hoffman, for example, argue that "requiring
the pleading of a piercing claim (including in amendments) is the
majority rule" citing ten federal court cases but in discussing the
minority rule identify three federal district courts which allowed veil-

124.

Id.

125. JAMES J. HANKS, JR., MARYLAND CORPORATION LAw § 4.18 PIERCING THE
CORPORATE VEIL "A HERCULEAN TASK" (Supp. 2013).

126. See Residential Warranty Corp. v. Bancroft Homes Greenspring Valley, Inc.,
728 A.2d 783, 789 (Md. App. 1999) (although the Court of Appeals has opined that a
corporation may be pierced to enforce a paramount equity, no Maryland appellate
court has permitted this to occur).
127. Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 10 (N.Y. 1966). Contra Goldberg v. Lee
Exp. Cab Corp., 634 N.Y.S.2d 337, 338 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), aff'd, 642 N.Y.S.2d 292
(App. Div. 1996) ("[P]laintiffs have set forth 'a cognizable action for piercing the
corporate veil[s] and assigning personal liability' to defendant More in this action.").
128. See Amfac Foods, Inc. v. Int'l Sys. & Controls Corp., 654 P.2d 1092, 1098 (Or.
1982).
129. 2005 WL 503721, at *1 (Mass. Jan. 14, 2005).
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piercing claims based on liberal notice pleading.i3o Although it is not
clear what method they used to determine "majority" and "minority"
rules, even if they are ultimately correct, the minority view is a
considerable one which, as they concede, may under represent
successful veil-piercing efforts in these "lenient" jurisdictions. This is
one of several distortions arising from Erie discussed below.
B. Elements of Veil-PiercingClaims
Despite the influences civil procedure exercises over when and
how veil-piercing claims may be brought, corporate law scholars,
treatise-writers, and empirical observers have overwhelmingly
focused on the core inquiry courts undertake when deciding whether,
and under what circumstances, to pierce the corporate veil,
emphasizing the evident arbitrariness in applying those inquiries.13'
Those venturing into the subject after 1985 are obliged to quote
Easterbook and Fischel's pithy phrase equating veil-piercing to
lightning for its mystery and unpredictability.132 The subtext of these
criticisms almost always implicates judges themselves. Presser, for
example, argues that veil-piercing is "a doctrine applied by courts in
an extremely discretionary manner, in accordance with the
individual conscience of judges."133
Given the frustration scholars express over the unpredictability
of veil-piercing, it is surprising that the scholarly inquiry has focused
on the aspect of veil-piercing over which there isbroad agreement.
Ever since Frederick J. Powell sought to codify and expand Maurice
Wormser's normative work as to when the corporate veil should or
should not be pierced, (a phrase Wormser is crediting with
popularizing), Powell's three-part test has generally been asserted as
representative of what courts actually do. Powell's "rule" allows
courts to pierce the corporate veil, provided a court find "complete
control and domination, [by] a shareholder... perpetuat[ing] a
fraud, wrong, or injustice that has proximately caused unjust loss or
injury to the plaintiff'.34 Powell further compiled the inquiries courts
undertook within each of the three parts of the test, including
ownership
of
stock,
overlapping
directors
and
officers,
undercapitalization, commingling of corporate and shareholder funds

130. Boyd & Hoffman, supra note 13, at n. 121.
131. Presser, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 2010 §1:1.
132. See Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 409,
434 (2012) ("[L]ightning ....is rare, severe, and unprincipled."); Matheson, supra note
71, at 1100; Oh, supra note 14, at 85; P.R. Strauss, Control and/or Misconduct:
Clarifying the Test for Piercing the Corporate Veil in Alaska, 9 ALASKA L. REV. 65, 65
n.4 (1992); Glenn G. Morris, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Louisiana, 52 LA. L. REV.
271, 272 n.3 (1991).
133. Presser, supra note 131, §1.1.
134. Oh, supra note 14, at 84.
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and property, and observation of corporate formalities.135 In a
seminal article on the history of the debate, Cathy and James Krendl
wrote that Powell's formulation "is of interest, not only because it is
perhaps the most frequently applied and most clearly articulated of
the rules in the corporate veil area, but also because its parts include
most of the other rules in this area."136 Robert Thompson and Charles
O'Kelley note that "judicial and academic [commentators] have
expanded and re-arranged [Powell's] lists, and most court opinions
are structured so as to give the appearance that the court has
actually applied the test and the factors."137 Peter Oh similarly
identifies Powell's test as the "most common" veil-piercing test.13s
To be sure, there are indeterminacies within Powell's framework.
Undercapitalization, for example, may independently show that a
shareholder controlled the corporation (e.g. it was undercapitalized
because a controlling shareholder siphoned away its funds); that the
undercapitalization itself served as the wrong committed (e.g. a
corporation undertook excessively risky activities without adequate
self or second-party insurance to adequately protect the public
against those risks); and, that the undercapitalization was the
proximate cause of a plaintiffs injury (e.g. there would be no veilpiercing action but for a judgment the corporation could not satisfy).
It is not clear, however, that this indeterminacy ultimately
explains veil-piercing's unpredictability. Indeed, it is a subtle but
important assumption of this paper that the elements of veil-piercing
claims are, as commentators have noted, relatively uniform.139 Part
of the problem with the existing literature is that scholars place
these elements at the core of their inquiry, seeking to explain why if
the elements are uniform the outcomes are not.140 As I noted in the
discussion of pleading and presumption above, the availability of the
corporate form itself implicates a deal between entrepreneurs and
society which is reflected in procedural variation when that deal is in
dispute. In this Part, my intent is not to re-hash the debate over core
veil-piercing inquiries, but only to survey the ways in which civil
procedure shapes those inquiries. Because few states have codified
veil-piercing tests, courts are often left to decide whether, and under
what conditions, veil-piercing claims may proceed. 141

135. Cathy S. Krendl & James R. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the
Inquiry, 55 DENV. L.J. 1, 13 n.41 (1978).
136. Id. at 13.
137. CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 609 (6th ed. 2010).
138. See Oh, supra note 14, at 84.
139. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.747 (2014) ('2. A stockholder, director or officer
acts as the alter ego of a corporation if:
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1. Distinctions between Corporate and Natural Person
Shareholders
One of Thompson's findings which surprised corporate law
scholars was that courts within his dataset pierced to reach
individuals more frequently than they pierced to reach corporate
shareholders.142 But many jurisdictions make available additional
legal theories tailored to suits against corporate families, especially
in the tort context. The result is that actions that successfully unify
shareholder and corporate assets may not be caught by the database
searches current studies employ. This may explain why success
against individual shareholders occurs at a disproportionately higher
rate in these study results.
In Georgia, veil-piercing theories against individuals and
corporate groups are divided, respectively, into "alter ego" and
"business conduit" tests. 143 While Georgia courts have over time
collapsed the inquiries related to these kinds of suits, the nominal
distinction remains.144
The business conduit theory relates to the activities of two or more
corporations, usually a parent and its subsidiary, which operate in
such a manner that the subsidiary corporation retains insufficient
earnings to finance its activities and pay its obligations. In such
instances, the profits are channeled to the parent, while the
obligations remain with the undercapitalized subsidiary. The alter
ego doctrine arises where the parent corporation or corporate
officers, directors or stockholders disregard the corporate entity by
commingling and confusing their personal affairs and business
with those of the corporation, treating the corporate property as
their own. 145
Similarly, in Massachusetts, different tests apply to a single
enterprise theory of corporate liability versus suits to reach the
assets of individual shareholders. A mix of state and federal courts
applying Massachusetts law suggest that while a showing of fraud or
improper purpose is required for the latter, the former relies more

(a) The corporation is influenced and governed by the stockholder, director or officer;
(b) There is such unity of interest and ownership that the corporation and the
stockholder, director or officer are inseparable from each other; and
(c) Adherence to the corporate fiction of a separate entity would sanction fraud or
promote a manifest injustice.
3. The question of whether a stockholder, director or officer acts as the alter ego of a
corporation must be determined by the court as a matter of law.").
142.

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FIsCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF

CORPORATE LAw 56 n.9 (1991).
143. STUART FINESTONE, GEORGIA POST-JUDGMENT COLLECTION § 13:4 (5th ed.
2013).
144. Id.
145. Id.
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generally on principles of agency, and the two inquiries differ in key
respects.146
In Texas, individual shareholders were not included in one of the
earlier and most quoted formulations of the rule;147 and until 2009,
which covers nearly the entire time frame under which empirical
studies of veil-piercing cases were conducted, a "single business
enterprise" theory in Texas allowed plaintiffs to aggregate corporate
groups for liability purposes.148 Even after the Supreme Court of
Texas spoke specifically to the single business enterprise theory in
SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Investments,149 Texas courts appear to
continue to allow the theory-without accompanying veil-piercing
claims-to apply to negligence cases involving corporate groups.50
California has similarly adopted the single business enterprise
theory to apply to sibling corporations, while alter ego liability
applies in the parent-subsidiary context.151 In Louisiana, a separate
single business enterprise theory applies to corporate siblings and
parents, with components of the test that are "similar" to other veilpiercing inquiries, but ultimately hinge on a determination that
"When a group of... corporations integrate their resources to
achieve a common business purpose" and do not operate as separate
entities, each affiliated corporation may be held liable "for debts
incurred in pursuit of the ... general business purpose."52 This
standard is similar for liability associated with a joint venture,
available in most states, although not uniformly defined.
2. Distinctions between Contract, Tort and Other Claims
Veil-piercing theories may be based on the breach of a number of
146. See Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co. v. Checkers, Inc., 754 F.2d 10, 15 (1st Cir.
1985); George Hyman Constr. Co. v. Gateman, 16 F. Supp. 2d 129, 158 (D. Mass. 1998)
(asserting heightened proof to reach individual shareholders); Evans v. Multicon
Constr. Corp., 574 N.E.2d 395, 398 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (discussing piercing against
individuals); My Bread Baking Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 748, 752
(Mass. 1968) (discussing piercing in corporate groups).
147. See Cont'l Supply Co. v. Forrest E. Gilmore Co., 55 S.W.2d 622, 628 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1933).
148. SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. Co., 275 S.W.3d 444, 450-51 (Tex. 2009).
149. Id. at 451-56.
150. Richards v. Transocean, Inc., 333 S.W.3d 326, 331 (Tex. App. 2010).
151. Las Palmas Assocs. v. Las Palmas Ctr. Assocs., 235 Cal. App.3d 1220, 1249-50
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
152. Brown v. ANA Ins. Grp., 965 So.2d 902, 926 (La. Ct. App. 2007). The "single
business enterprise" doctrine is a theory for imposing liability where two or more
business entities act as one. Generally, under the doctrine, when corporations
integrate their resources in operations to achieve a common business purpose, each
business may be held liable for wrongful acts done in pursuit of that purpose. See Kurt
A. Strasser, Piercing the Veil in Corporate Groups, 37 CONN. L. REV. 637, 646 (2005);
Brown v. Auto. Cas. Ins. Co., 644 So.2d 723, 727 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Green v.
Champion Ins. Co, 577 So.2d 249, 259 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
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legal duties, including those imposed by virtue of a contract or other
enforceable agreement, by courts and common law doctrine like
negligence and intentional torts, and by regulations and statutes
covering a range of industry sectors including construction, consumer
products, employment, financial instruments, insurance, medical
services, motor carriers, natural resource extraction, tax,
transportation, and workers' compensation.153 In the case of the
latter class of legal obligations, states are not uniform in the range of
industries they regulate, the extent to which they regulate those
sectors, nor the associated contractual relationships and public
interests connected to those sectors. Generally speaking, "[i]n the
field of ... tax legislation, courts have generally refused, for various
reasons, to separate the corporate entities of the parent company and
the wholly owned subsidiary in order to grant relief from such taxes
at the expense of the state."154 This multiplicity alone brings into
doubt the wisdom of studying aggregations of veil-piercing cases.
To the extent that veil-piercing can be accurately or effectively
characterized as an equitable remedy, it should only be available
where there is no adequate legal remedy otherwise provided by
statutes or common law rules specific to these issue-areas.55 This is
why in Illinois a plaintiff may not sustain a veil-piercing action
against a controlling shareholder where an alternative claim for
breach of fiduciary duty against that shareholder is available.156 It
similarly explains why a subcontractor in Massachusetts may not
pierce the corporate veil of a general contractor if it does not avail
itself of alternative procedural or statutory protections.157
Nevertheless, the general distinctions between contract, tort,
voluntary and involuntary creditors, statutory, and criminal veilpiercing actions pervade the literature with "the distinction between
common law contract and tort creditors ... a major fault line in the
law of veil piercing."158 Thompson upended the conventional wisdom

153. See LaBelle v. Crepeau, 593 A.2d 653, 654 (Me. 1991) (limiting worker's relief
to workers' compensation instead of veil-piercing claim); Maine Aviation Corp. v.
Johnson, 196 A.2d 748, 750 (Me. 1964) (unifying corporations and shareholders for
purposes of site location law).
154. Bonnar-Vawter, Inc. v. Johnson, 173 A.2d 141, 145 (Me. 1961).
155.

See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS

380 (4th ed. 2010).
156. Graham v. Mimms, 444 N.E.2d 549, 561 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
157. See Evans v. Multicon Constr. Corp., 574 N.E.2d 398, 400 (Mass. App. Ct.
1991) ("Particularly in the area of construction, there is a statutory scheme which
permits subcontractors to obtain a lien for labor or material furnished against the
improved real estate ....
Evans chose not to avail himself of that remedy. A litigant
may also obtain an attachment against assets of a defendant whose assets, as was the
case with [Multicon Construction Corporation], might not be susceptible to an
execution.").
158. Boyd & Hoffman, supra note 13, at 860 (citing Henry Hansmann and Reinier
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by finding that contract creditors prevailed in veil-piercing actions at
a higher rate than tort creditors, although subsequent research has
not confirmed his fmdings.159 Peter Oh's recent analysis found a
substantial discrepancy toward tort creditors even in Thompson's
original time period.160 More importantly, Oh broke new ground on
the role of fraud claims in shaping scholars' analyses of tort versus
creditor claims, separately examining fraud as a hybrid claim that
further confused the contract/tort landscape. 161
But even with these nuances in the literature, the contract/tort
distinction is explicit in the laws of states like Texas and West
Virginia, and it plays a jurisprudentially relevant role for other
states as well.162 The result is that aggregating veil-piercing
outcomes for cases adjudicating contract and tort actions obscures
relevant legal or evidentiary distinctions between them.
Even before the Supreme Court of Texas and the Texas
legislature substantially altered the veil-piercing landscape between
1986 and 1989, contract and tort actions were subjected to different
standards by courts. 163 In their analysis of Texas veil-piercing cases,
Hamilton, Miller, and Ragazzo found that in contract cases, courts
generally concluded that third party creditors were better positioned
to bear contracting risk and therefore piercing inquiries focused on
the integrity of the ex ante bargaining process or particularly
egregious ex post conduct.164 In tort cases, Texas courts allowed risk
to be shifted to corporations based on the following factors:
(i) the adequacy of the capitalization of the corporation in light of
the nature and risks of the business being engaged in, (ii) whether
available corporate funds had been responsibility utilized to
provide a reasonable degree of protection to third persons tortiously
injured by corporate action, typically through the purchase of
liability insurance, or (iii) whether there was misuse or excessive
distributions of assets to shareholders, either directly or

Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE
L.J. 1879, 1916-23 (1991)).
159. Hodge & Sachs, supranote 12, at 353-54.
160. See Oh, Supra note 14, at 127.
161. Id. at 89.
162. Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Gen. Prod. Corp., 643 F.2d 413, 419 (6th Cir. 1981)
(applying Ohio law).
163. Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 279-80 (Tex. 1986) (Gonzalez, J.,
dissenting).
164.

ELIZABETH S. MILLER & ROBERT A. RAGAZZO, TEXAS METHODS OF PRACTICE §

46:2 (2014) ("Piercing should be permitted in contract cases only where the plaintiff
can demonstrate significant abuse of the bargaining process or the manner in which
the corporation's business is thereafter conducted, for example through fraud,
deception, or operation of the corporation in unexpected ways that improperly divert
corporate assets to shareholders while bypassing corporate liabilities.") (citing ROBERT
HAMILTON, 19 TEXAS PRACTICE: BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 234 (2003)).
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indirectly.165

In 1986, the Texas Supreme Court decided Castleberry v.
Branscum,166 which significantly expanded the grounds upon which
shareholder assets might be reached as well as concluding for the
first time that veil-piercing was a question for a jury.167 In a dispute
in which two business partners secretly established a competing
business and then diverted business using the first corporation's
assets, the Supreme Court of Texas used the case to establish the
availability of veil-piercing in a wide range of legal situations.168
The Court then set forth a broad veil-piercing test allowing
Texas courts to disregard the corporate fiction, "'even though
corporate formalities have been observed and [the] corporate and
individual property have been kept separately,' when the corporate
form [has been] used 'as part of a basically unfair device to achieve
an inequitable result."'169 "To prove there has been a sham to
perpetrate a fraud, tort claimants and contract creditors must show
only constructive fraud... the breach of some legal or equitable duty
which, irrespective of moral guilt, the law declares fraudulent
because of its tendency to deceive others, to violate confidence, or to
injure public interests."170
The
Court furthermore clarified
that a veil-piercing
determination was squarely the province of the jury. 171
Following the Castleberry decision, the Texas legislature
amended article 2.21 of the Texas Business Corporation Act in
1989.172 The Texas legislature expressly made piercing to satisfy
contractual obligations impossible without a showing of actual fraud,
although constructive fraud remains a valid theory for tort actions. 173

165.
166.

Id.
Castleberry,721 S.W.2d 270.

167. Id. at 271-77; see also ROBERT W. HAMILTON AND JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY

COMPANIES 347 (8th ed. 2003). The Texas law of piercing the corporate veil took a
bizarre turn in Castleberry v. Branscum - a case decided by a five to four vote. The
court rewrote the traditional piercing rhetoric so broadly that it appeared likely that
thereafter shareholders' protection from liability on both contract and tort obligations
had become entirely dependent on a jury's determination that the transaction met
some undefined and abstract standard of fairness.
168. See Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 272 & n.3 (citing Torregrossa v. Szele, 603
S.W.2d 803, 804-05 (Tex. 1980); Tigrett v. Pointer, 580 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex. App.
1979)).
169.

ELIZABETH S. MILLER & ROBERT A. RAGAZZO, 13 TEX. PRAC., TEXAS METHODS

OF PRACTICE § 46:2 (quoting Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 271).
170. Castleberry,721 S.W.2d at 273.
171. See id. at 273. See generally Brent Lee, Veil Piercingand Actual Fraud Under
Article 2.21 of the Texas Business CorporationAct, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 427, 429 (2002).
172. Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 2.21 (expired Jan. 1, 2011).
173. Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. § 21.223 (West 2007).
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In West Virginia, the Supreme Court of Appeals adopted as part
of its veil-piercing test an inquiry as to whether a party could
effectively investigate a corporate counterparty's financial health and
contractually secure its interests.174 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine similarly imposed "a more stringent standard of proof to a
contract creditor of the corporation" than a tort creditor. 175 In
Illinois, this distinction is even more specific in the landlord-tenant
context where a party that enters into a lease with a corporation as
counter-party is estopped from denying the corporation's separate
existence.176 Many jurisdictions do not specify particular differences
in their three-part tests but allow generally for heightened review in
contract cases. 177
Other jurisdictions, of course, specifically include and equate
both contract and tort actions in veil-piercing decisions.178 Yet
whether or not courts apply different tests to contract or tort claims
is not acknowledged in many of the most influential empirical
studies.
3. Undercapitalization and Expert Testimony
Although not strictly a matter of procedure or evidence,
undercapitalization is treated uniformly in studies to date.179 Yet the
reasons and evidentiary context of undercapitalization claims
influences not only the likelihood of veil-piercing success, but also
whether undercapitalization sounds principally in contract or tort.1s0
For example, in Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., the Supreme Court of West
Virginia specifically recognized the necessity for expert testimony on
the issue of adequate capitalization:
For example, comparison with the capitalization of other
corporations in the same or a similar line of business may be made.
The capitalization of the corporation in question could be compared
with the average industry-wide ratios (current ratio, acid-test ratio,
debt/equity ratio, etc.) obtained from published sources (Dunn &
Bradstreet, Moody's Manual of Investments, Standard and Poor's
Corporation Records, etc.). These average ratios could be
174. Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93, 100 (W. Va. 1986); see also Hill v.
Fairfield Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, 134 So.3d 396, 412 (Ala. 2013) (Murdock,
J. concurring).
175. See Theberge v. Darbro, Inc., 684 A.2d 1298, 1304 (Me. 1996).
176. Boatman v. Jordan, 243 N.E.2d 644, 647 (Il. Ct. App. 1968).
177. Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 565 (N.D. 1985); Fiumetto v. Garrett,
749 N.E.2d 992, 1006 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
178. Penn Nat. Gaming, Inc. v. Ratliff, 954 So.2d 427, 431-32 (Miss. 2007); Hogan v.
Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 320 S.E.2d 555, 558 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
179. See supra text accompanying note 2.
180. See Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund v. World Transp., Inc., 241 F. Supp. 24
499, 504 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (recognizing the importance of undercapitalization in veilpiercing analysis).
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buttressed by expert testimony from certified public accountants,
securities analysts, investment counselors or other qualified
financial analysts. "Grossly inadequate capitalization" for the
purpose of piercing the corporate veil would generally be reflected
by a substantial deficiency of capital compared with that level of
capitalization deemed adequate in the case by the financial analyst
experts.IS1
In the Collet case, the Missouri Court of Appeals reasoned that
capital was inadequate because it was below industry standards. 182
In reaching this conclusion, the court stated: "Plaintiffs experts,
whose testimony was accepted by the trial court, clearly testified [the
defendant's] capitalization was far below industry standards."183
These courts, in essence, applied a level of care standard to
capitalization levels, a standard that corresponds with a negligence
action. The role of expert testimony in establishing an industry
standard appears relevant if not decisive. Compare these
"negligence" undercapitalization cases with of the type occurring in
Consumer's Co-op of Walworth County v. Olsen, in which a contract
creditor asserted undercapitalization as a basis to pierce even though
the creditor continued to allow the defendant to purchase in violation
of its own contractual terms. 184 The court refused to pierce the veil on
the basis of undercapitalization, noting that contract creditors should
investigate risks involved in dealing with the defendant creditor.I5
C. Evidentiary Burdens
Just as pleading standards and presumptions shape the
availability and course of veil-piercing claims in influential ways not
adequately recognized in current studies, evidentiary burdens and
standards not only shape disputes but also reflect social choices
about the strength of the legal separation between shareholders and
corporations.186 Burdens of proof represent a choice to allocate the
risk of an erroneous decision between the parties.187 A preponderance

181. 352 S.E.2d 93, 101 (W. Va. 1986) (citation omitted).
182. Collet v. American Nat'l Stores, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 273, 287 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
183. Id.; see also S. Lumber & Coal Co. v. M.P. Olson Real Estate & Constr. Co., 426
N.W.2d 504, 510 (Neb. 1988) (holding that the corporation was not undercapitalized
because plaintiff and defendant's expert agreed that corporate capitalization "was
consistent with the usual course of business in the housing construction industry at
the time"); J. L. Brock Builders, Inc. v. Dahlbeck, 391 N.W.2d 110, 114 (Neb. 1986)
(finding that although experts agree that the corporation was undercapitalized,
undercapitalization in the home construction business was not unusual and that home
construction businesses could meet the "industry standard" capitalization).
184. 419 N.W.2d 211, 222 (Wis. 1988).
185. Id.
186. See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 95 (1981) (stating that standard of proof is
traditionally left to judiciary to resolve).
187. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370-71 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[A]
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of the evidence standard, commonly applied in veil-piercing cases,
suggests that society accepts equally the chance that a judge or a
jury may reach the wrong conclusion as between a damaged party
and a shareholder who relied on the legal separation between herself
and the corporation. A reasonable doubt standard, most frequently
applied in the criminal context, allocates the risk of loss away from
the defendant, reflecting a strong desire for the wrongfully accused to
be found innocent, even if it also results in the exoneration of some
guilty defendants. A "clear and convincing" standard lies in between,
imposing on the party who bears it a burden to produce in the mind
of the judge or jury "a firm belief or conviction" or similar level of
persuasion as to the allegations made.18s It is typically used "in civil
cases involving allegations of fraud or some other quasi-criminal
wrongdoing by the defendant."189
The distinction between the burdens of proof that veil-piercing
parties bear and the claims which accompany or underlie a veilpiercing action frequently blurs. If a jurisdiction requires a finding of
fraud as a precondition to piercing; a heightened pleading standard
for fraud; and, a clear-and-convincing burden of proof for fraud, it has
gone far toward closing the door altogether on veil-piercing purely as
a procedural matter. Given the diversity of perspectives on the
fundamental deal struck between society and entrepreneurs, it is no
surprise that those perspectives are reflected in legal standards that
inevitably
allocate
resources
either
toward
protecting
corporate/shareholder separation or circumscribing its use.
These distinctions, if they are considered, are not obvious in the
literature. Thompson, for example, locates variation in courts' veilpiercing behavior "with the context, and decisions [that] reflect the
differing impact of various statutory policies affecting limited
liability."i1o Thompson does not appear to include evidentiary
variations within this context, nor does he explicitly address them in
his study. Peter Oh's analysis is focused on fraud,191 but breaking
down fraud claims between contract and tort actions ex ante without
controlling for evidentiary differences may result in effectively
mixing contract and tort actions ex post. For example, in the veilpiercing context, many jurisdictions do not impose heightened
burdens of proof, even when backed by claims of fraud. 192

standard of proof represents an attempt to instruct the fact-finder concerning the
degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual
conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.").
188. Aiello v. Knoll Golf Club, 165 A.2d 531, 533-34 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960).
189. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979).
190. Thompson, supranote 12, at 1039.
191. Oh, supra note 12, at 90.
192. See infra Section IlCI.
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1. Preponderance of the Evidence, Heightened Standards of
Proof, or Clear and Convincing Evidence
Depending on procedural context, especially whether or not a
judge or jury serves as trier of fact, jurisdictions impose
preponderance, clear-and-convincing, and other intermediate forms
of evidentiary burden. The link between this burden and the social
welfare shareholder/corporate separation is intended to promote is
sometimes explicit. In Grayson v. R.B. Ammon & Associations Inc., a
Louisiana appellate court reasoned that, "because Louisiana
considers the concept of the corporation beneficial, the principle that
the corporation is a separate entity should be disregarded only in
exceptional circumstances ... [It is reasonable to conclude that [veilpiercing] should ...be subjected to the same burden of proof, i.e.,
clear and convincing evidence.193
States that have adopted a preponderance of the evidence
standard have not generally tied the decision to do so to any explicit
judicial policy.194 Where they have provided some rationale, courts
applying a preponderance standard have stated that an action to
pierce the corporate veil is no different than accompanying causes of
action that also require a preponderance finding. In one of the
lengthier discussions of the issue, a Connecticut appellate court
rejected the suggestion that it adopt a clear-and-convincing standard,
citing both federal law and practice in the states of Nebraska,
Nevada and Hawaii.195 Yet the issue is clearly of concern where it is

193. Grayson v. R. B. Ammon and Assocs., Inc., 778 So.2d 1, 14 (La. Ct. App. 2000);
see also C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight L.P., 580 S.E.2d 806, 811 (Va. 2003) (applying a
clear and convincing standard in the reverse veil piercing context but equating the
standard for reverse piercing with other veil-piercing actions for purposes of
evidentiary burdens): Harlow v. Fibron Corp., 671 P.2d 40, 45-46 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that fraud was not established by clear and convincing evidence).
194. See Fazio v. Brotman, 371 N.W.2d 842, 846 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); Alternative
Nursing Care, Inc. v. C.H. Wright, Inc., No. CV-01-168, 2003 WL 21911056, at *3 (Me.
Super. Ct., Jun. 2, 2003).
195. Litchfield Asset Management Corp. v. Howell, 799 A.2d 298, 310-311 (2002),
overruled on other grounds by Robinson v. Coughlin, 830 A.2d 1114 (2003) (citing JL.
Brock Builders, Inc. v. Dahlbeck, 391 N.W.2d 110 (Neb.1986) (relaxed standard for
fraud); Wyatt v. Bowers, 747 P.2d 881 (Nev.1970) (applying the preponderance of
evidence standard of proof to veil piercing)); see also Mid-South Mgmt. Co. Inc. v.
Sherwood Dev. Corp., 649 S.E.2d 135, 140 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007) (applying
preponderance of the evidence standard to veil piercing claim); Byars v. v. Herman,
No. 83496, 2004 WL 1532224, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) ("To pierce the corporate veil
and impose personal liability on a shareholder, the burden is on the party seeking to
pierce the corporate veil to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence..."); Crutchfield
v. Russ-Mar, Inc., No. CA 98-901, 1999 WIL 151646, at *3 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999)
(implicitly upholding preponderance standard); Priskie v. Missry, 958 So.2d 613, 613
(Fla. Ct. App. 2007) ("Generally, the rule is that the corporate veil will not be pierced
absent a showing of improper conduct . . . . 'Three factors must be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence: (1) the shareholder dominated and controlled the
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raised. In McCallum Family L.L.C. v. Winger, a Colorado appellate
court explicitly rejected the Colorado Supreme Court's dicta
suggesting a clear-and-convincing standard for veil-piercing claims
based on an applicable Colorado statute which generally imposes a
preponderance burden for civil claims.196
Other states impose an intermediate or heightened burden of
proof to veil-piercing claims. Georgia courts do not expressly state
what standard of proof the plaintiff must meet, but case law suggests
a heightened standard is applied due to the court's practice of using
caution when asked to disregard the corporate entity.197 In Illinois, to
pierce the corporate veil, the plaintiff bears the burden of making a
"substantial showing".198 New York courts impose a "heavy burden"
of showing each element of a veil-piercing claim.199
2. Fraud
The distinction between these social choices plays out not only in
veil-piercing claims generally, but specifically as to contract, tort, or
fraud actions, the latter of which may cut across the former. In 2005,
a New Jersey trial court, for example, likening actions to pierce the
corporate veil in the contract context to equitable fraud actions,
imposed a clear-and-convincing standard of proof based on the
history of equitable fraud actions in the chancery courts.200 It
corporation to such an extent that the corporation's independent existence, was in fact
non-existent and the shareholders were in fact alter egos of the corporation (2) the
corporate form must have been used fraudulently or for an improper purpose and (3)
the fraudulent or improper use of the corporate form caused injury to the claimant."'
(quoting Seminole Boatyard, Inc. v. Christoph, 715 So.2d 987, 990 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998)); Escobedo v. BHM Health Associates, Inc., 818 N.E.2d 930 (Ind. 2004) (A party
seeking to pierce the corporate veil "may only recover from a shareholder if the party
proves by a preponderance of the evidence 'that the corporate form was so ignored,
controlled or manipulated that it was merely the instrumentality of another and that
the misuse of the corporate form would constitute a fraud or promote injustice."'
(quoting Aronson v. Price, 644 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ind. 1994)); Ize Nantan Bagowa, Ltd.
v. Scalia, 577 P.2d 725, 729 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) ("[I]t is incumbent upon one seeking
to pierce the corporate veil to show by preponderance of evidence that financial setup
of corporation is only a sham and causes an injustice.").
196. McCallum Family L.L.C. v. Winger, 221 P.3d 69, 74 (Colo. App. 2009) (rejecting
the clear and convincing standard imposed by the Colorado Supreme Court in In re
Phillips, 139 P.3d 639, 644 (Colo. 2006) as outside the scope of the question certified to
the Colorado Supreme Court).
197. See, e.g., Soerries v. Dancause, 546 S.E.2d 356, 358 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
198. Kelsey Axle & Break Div. v. Presco Plastics, Inc., 543 N.E.2d 239, 244 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1989).
199. Joseph Kali Corp. v. A. Goldner, Inc., 859 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (2008).
200. D.R. Horton Inc. - N.J. v. Dynastar Dev., L.L.C., No. MER-L-1808-00, 2005 WL
1939778, at *23 (N.J. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2005) ("Applying these considerations, the
court concludes that a fact-finder should have a higher degree of confidence in a claim
to pierce the veil on a private contract claim. The same considerations that call for a
heightened level of proof in an equitable or legal fraud claim are at play in a corporate
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specifically reserved the question of whether a similar burden of
proof would apply in the tort context, although it suggested it would
not.201 In ServiceMaster v. J.R.L. Enterprises, for example, the
Nebraska Supreme Court imposed a clear and convincing evidence
burden of proof on a veil-piercing claim based on fraudulent
misrepresentation.202 In the same term, it approved a preponderance
of the evidence standard-one that could be met with circumstantial
evidence-where the question rested squarely on whether the
corporate form was used to perpetrate fraud.203 In the former case,
the dispute arose from payments due under a franchising license. In
the latter, consistent with a claim for fraudulent conveyance, a sole
shareholder transferred to himself all of a corporation's assets upon
its dissolution, leaving a number of creditors without even partial
payment. 204 By altering the burden to that of a more stringent
standard in the presence of fraud allegations, Maine courts
emphasize that such allegations. allow plaintiffs in veil piercing cases
to prevail only if the evidence supporting them can be founded as
highly probably versus merely more probable than not. 205
Many jurisdictions, however, retain the preponderance of the
evidence standard, even for fraud. In Anthony v. Delagrange
Remodeling, Inc.,206 a Michigan appellate court explicitly rejected a
clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard for fraud in the veilpiercing context, noting both that a preponderance standard was
proper where, under Michigan law, "[fraud may be proved by facts
that are inconsistent with an honest purpose"207 and that "the
corporate veil may be pierced even in the absence of fraud."2os While
the Texas legislature overruled the constructive fraud aspect of the
Texas Supreme Court's Castleberry decision, it left the
preponderance of the evidence and jury determination aspects of the
decision in place; the effect was to divide actual and constructive

veil piercing claim."); Notes, 60 HARV. L. REV. 111, 112 (1946).
201. D.R. Horton Inc., 2005 WL 1939778, at *23.
202. ServiceMaster Indus. v. J.R.L. Enterprises, 388 N.W.2d 39, 43 (Neb. 1986).
203. See Brock Builders, Inc. v. Dahlbeck, 391 N.W.2d 110, 115 (Neb. 1986); see also
Wolf v. Walt, 530 N.W.2d 890, 891 (Neb. 1995).
204. The court wrote "Among the factors relevant in determining whether to
disregard the corporate entity are . .."and then proceeded to list the factors without
including the caveat "on the basis of fraud." Global Credit Servs., Inc. v. AMISUB
(Saint Joseph Hosp.) Inc., 508 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Neb. 1993).
205. Taylor v. Comm'r of Mental Health & Retardation, 481 A.2d 139, 153 (Me.
1984).
206. Anthony v. Delarange Remodeling, Inc., No. 252644, 2005 WL 602561 (Mich.
Ct. App. March 15, 2005).
207. Id. at *7 (citing Foodland Distribs. V. Al-Naimi, 559 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Mich.
1996))
208. Id. at *7 (citing Foodland Distribs., 559 N.W.2d at 382).
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fraud claims according to their elements.209
Conversely, Maryland effectively requires a party seeking to
pierce the corporate veil to plead fraud to a heightened standard
"clear and specific acts"210 and do so through "clear and convincing"
proof that all elements of fraud exist.211 Showing fraud by
preponderance of the evidence is explicitly insufficient.212 In
Maryland, these standards apply to both constructive and actual
fraud, for if one type required a lesser degree of proof than the other,
the form of fraud alleged would be chosen based upon the burden of
proof it carried with it.213 Maryland contrasts with many other
jurisdictions which do not require a finding of fraud.214
These variations limit the usefulness of studies that bundle
together jurisdictions with differing rules of civil procedure and
evidence, which account for nearly all studies to date except Boyd's
and Hoffman's. Oh notes that "general" versus "specific" evidence of
fraud or misrepresentation affect veil-piercing conclusions, but does
not control for procedural variables that would make that comparison
difficult or impossible.215 It may make more sense to sort fraud
actions not into contract (fraudulent misrepresentation) or tort
(deceit) varieties but rather into the standards of proof parties must
meet in order to prevail on veil-piercing fraud claims.
D. Jury Access in Veil-Piercing Cases
Although all studies acknowledge that the circumstances
surrounding settlement represent an important variable, none assess
the availability of a jury as a factor influencing 1) the willingness of
209. Brent Lee, Veil Piercing and Actual Fraud Under Article 2.21 of the Texas
Business Corporation Act, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 427, 429 (2002) (citing Castleberry v.
Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Tex. 1986)) (finding that the following causes of
action incorporate actual fraud: (1) material misrepresentations; (2) fraudulent
inducement; (3) tortious interference with contractual relations; (4) conspiracy; (5)
statutory claims).
210. JAMES J. HANKS, JR., § 4.18 PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL "A HERCULEAN
TASK"; MARYLAND CORPORATION LAW 122.14 (2013).
211. Residential Warranty Corp. v. Bancroft Homes Greenspring Valley, Inc., 728
A.2d 783, 790 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999); Colandrea v. Colandrea, 401 A.2d 480, 484
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979); see also, Starfish Condo Ass'n v. Yorkridge Serv. Corp., 458
A.2d 805, 816 (Md. 1983).
212. Dixon v. Process Corp., 382 A.2d 893, 893 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978).
213. Id. at 901; see also Serio v. Baystate Properties, LLC, 39 A.3d 131, cert. denied,
426 Md. 428 (2012).
214. Inter-Tel Techs., Inc. v. Linn Station Props., LLC, 360 S.W.3d 152, 163-65 (Ky.
2012) ("[T]o the extent White can be read to require evidence of actual fraud before an
entity's veil is pierced, it is overruled."); Misik v. D'Arco, 130 Cal. Rprt. 3d 123, 130
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011) ("Application of the alter ego doctrine does not depend upon
pleading or proof of fraud.") (quoting Eng'g Serv. Corp. v. Longridge Inv. Co., 314 P.2d
563, 570 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957)).
215. Oh, supra note 14, at 137-39.
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parties to settle or 2) the kinds of veil-piercing claims (contract or
tort) that reach a trial (and are therefore reported).216 This is
important in state jurisdictions because it may mean that aggregate
analyses capture a disproportionate number of veil-piercing cases
from jurisdictions in which there is no access to a jury. This would be
similarly true for federal district courts which do not uniformly give
access to juries for veil-piercing claims. While the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals has squarely addressed the issue of veil-piercing
claims for federal district courts located in Wisconsin, Illinois and
Indiana (veil-piercing is procedural under Erie and equitable under
the Seventh Amendment), federal district courts for the most part
have little guidance as to whether the U.S. Constitution requires
them to allow veil-piercing claimaints access to a jury under either
Erie or the Seventh Amendment. Current studies make little or no
effort to estimate where and why veil-piercing claims arise (or are
caught in database searches). California and New York courts donate
the most veil-piercing cases to current studies, which may be the
result of their large populations and commercial activity.217 But
population and commercial activity do not explain why Louisiana
cases represent a large portion of the cases analyzed by both
Thompson and Oh.21s Access to a jury may not only affect the
likelihood that a given cases reaches trial, but it may also shape
pleadings toward legal forms of relief and away from injunctive and
other equitable relief if the right to a jury is tied to the types of
claims that prevail in a given dispute.
1. Jury Right Jurisdictions
Several jurisdictions have established that veil-piercing claims
are entitled to jury determination.219 The reasons for this right vary.
The Supreme Court of Texas, for example, has tied the right to a jury

216. See Marc Galanter, The Civil Jury as Regulator of the Litigation Process, 1990
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 201, 208 (1990) ("Fear of juries leads defendants to settle suits,
whatever their merits."); Jason Solomon, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61
EMORY L.J. 1331, 1349 (2012) ("It is not clear how the injection of these values affects
outcomes, though one might speculate that a jury's willingness to award higher
damage awards might increase settlement amounts."); D. Brock Hornby, The Business
of the U.S. District Courts, 10 GREENBAG 453, 455 (2007) ("But the desire to control
costs (among insurers in particular) and a fear of jury unpredictability or break-thecompany verdicts provoke greater defense willingness to mediate, arbitrate, or settle
rather than bear the risk and extraordinary expense of trial.").
217. Oh, supra note 14, at 115; Thompson, supra note 12, at 1051-52.
218. Id.
219. Mark A. Olthoff, Beyond the Form-Should the Corporate Veil Be Pierced?, 64
UMKC L. REV. 311, 331 (1995) ("Several state courts have held that the issue of
piercing the corporate veil is one which may be resolved by the jury. These states
include Tennessee, Mississippi, North Dakota, North Carolina, Iowa, Florida, Texas,
and Georgia, as well as the District of Columbia.").
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trial on veil-piercing claims to state constitutional provisions
favoring jury determination of fact.220 Others, like the District of
Columbia, validate the availability of a jury after practice
undertaken in the lower courts.221 Moreover, jurisdictions like Idaho,
Florida, and North Carolina refer explicitly or implicitly to the close
relationship between the fact inquiries juries must make on legal
claims in contract or tort and the associated inquiries as to whether a
controlling shareholder violated legal duties as an individual or
through a corporate entity.222 In Mike v. Po Group, Inc., the
Tennessee Supreme Court noted that "[t]he conditions under which
the corporate entity will be disregarded vary according to the
circumstances present in each case .... [A] determination of whether
or not a corporation is a mere instrumentality of an individual or a
parent corporation is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury".223
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court rejected a trial court's directed
verdict for a veil-piercing defendant, noting that "[t]he ... evidence
raised substantial issues of fact as to the alleged defects that could
only be determined by the jury as fact-finder." 224 The Supreme Court
of Oregon implied that its veil-piercing jurisprudence had changed
with respect to jury determinations, noting that "[m]any of our
previous opinions in this area of the law were written with no view
that juries would be involved in the decisionmaking process in such
cases" yet establishing the specific charge juries should be given.225
While the Georgia Supreme Court has not spoken specifically to the
220.

Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 277 (Tex. 1986); Brent Lee, Veil

Piercing and Actual Fraud Under Article 2.21 of the Texas Business CorporationAct,
54 BAYLOR L. REV. 427, 445 (2002) (citing Tigrett v. Pointer, 580 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1978)); see also Oliver v. Marsh, 899 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995)).
221. See, e.g., Vuitch v. Furr, 482 A.2d 811, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Drilcon, Inc. v. Roil
Energy Corp., Inc 749 P.2d 1058 (Mont. 1988); Bakke v. D & A Landscaping Co., 820
N.W.2d 357 (N.D. 2012).
222. VFP VC v. Dakota Co., 109 P.3d 714, 723 (Idaho 2005) ('That even though the
jury may find Dakota committed the fraudulent act they may still find Durkin
personally liable if they believe Dakota and Durkin are the same entity as provided in
their instructions"); Maroun v. Wyreless Sys., Inc., 114 P.3d 974, 979 (Idaho 2005);
Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes, 450 So. 2d 1114, 1121 (Fla. 1984) ('The record
here indicates there was evidence which, if accepted by the jury, tended to show that
Dania and Carrousel operated independently of each other."); Glenn v. Wagner, 329
S.E.2d 326, 333 (N.C. 1985) ("Since the issue is one of fact, the trial court should take
pains to spell out in its instructions the specific factors to be considered in determining
whether the corporate entity should be disregarded.").
223. Mike v. Po Group, Inc., 937 S.W.2d 790, 795 (Tenn. 1996) (quoting Elec. Power
Bd. of Chattanooga v. St. Joseph Valley Structural Steel Corp., 691 S.W.2d 522, 526
(Tenn. 1985); see also Liberty Fin. Mgmt. Corp. v. Beneficial Data Processing Corp.,
670 S.W.2d 40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
224. Mgmt. Comm. of Graystone Pines Homeowners Ass'n v. Graystone Pines, Inc.,
652 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1982).
225. Amfac Foods, Inc. v. Int'l Sys. & Controls Corp., 654 P.2d 1092, 1096 n.3, 110102 (Or. 1982).
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issue, the consensus in its appellate decisions is that juries should
decide veil-piercing claims. 226
2. Jurisdictions Rejecting Jury Rights for Veil-Piercing
Claims
While jurisdictions authorizing a jury for veil-piercing claims
emphasize fact-specificity and the close relationship between veilpiercing and legal claims, jurisdictions which reject jury trial rights
do so uniformly on the basis that veil-piercing is an equitable action
and therefore the province of the trial judge.227 The Kentucky
Supreme Court declared unequivocally that "the doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil arises in equity" and is therefore the province of
the trial court judge and not the jury.22s The Wyoming Supreme
Court was equally emphatic, concluding "that there exists no right to
a jury trial on the issue of piercing the corporate veil" because it is an
equitable doctrine.229 Veil-piercing claims may only be heard by
Delaware's chancery courts. 230 Nevada has imposed this rule
statutorily, requiring that veil-piercing decisions be made by the trial
"court as a matter of law."231 California's Supreme Court has not
spoken directly to the availability of a jury to decide veil-piercing
claims, but there is substantial consensus in the appellate decisions
that no such right exists, again because of its status as an "equitable
remedy." 232
Nebraska's and Washington's Supreme Courts have declared
that juries may consider veil-piercing claims along with legal claims
they must decide, but, given the equitable nature of veil-piercing
claims, their pronouncements are merely advisory. 233
226. See Gardner v. Marcum, 665 S.E.2d 336, 339-40 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008); J & J
Materials, Inc. v. Conyers Seafood Co., 446 S.E.2d 781, 782-83 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994);
Fla. Shade Tobacco Growers, Inc. v. Duncan, 256 S.E.2d 644, 645 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979)
("When litigated, the issue of 'piercing the corporate veil' is a jury question.") (citation
omitted).
227. See C.T. Lowndes & Co. v. Suburban Gas & Appliance Co., 415 S.E.2d 404, 405
(S.C. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that piercing the corporate veil is an equitable action, and
as such "this Court may determine the facts according to its own view of the
preponderance of the evidence." (citing Sturkie v. Sifly, 313 S.E.2d 316, 318 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1984))).
228. Schultz v. Gen. Elec. Healthcare Fin. Servs. Inc., 360 S.W.3d 171, 175
(Ky. 2012).
229. Atlas Constr. Co. v. Slater, 746 P.2d 352, 359 (Wyo. 1987).
230. Sonne v. Sacks, 314 A.2d 194, 197 (Del. 1973).
231.

NEV. REV. STAT. §78.747(3) (2001).

232. See Olthoff, supra note 213, at 334-35 & n. 158.
233. See Wolf v. Walt, 530 N.W.2d 890, 895 (Neb. 1995); Thomas V. Harris,
Washington's Doctrine of CorporateDisregard, 56 WASH. L. REV. 253, 263-64 (1981)
("[I]ssues involving the doctrine [of corporate disregard] must be resolved by the trial
judge." (citing Sommer v. Yakima., 26 P.2d 92, 96, 100 (Wash. 1933))) ("[T]he trial
court empaneled an advisory jury, but granted judgment notwithstanding its
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3. Jurisdictions with Conditional Jury Rights
In many jurisdictions, the issue is unclear.234 This is attributable
to the assertion of a right to a jury trial which goes uncontested;
procedural rules which require litigation to proceed either as "legal"
and subject to jury determination or "equitable" and subject to
judicial determination; simple confusion among the parties and trial
judge; or, agreement between the parties to have equitable issues
tried by a jury. For example, actions to pierce the corporate veil in
Massachusetts may proceed as bench trials in their entirety, jury
trials in their entirety, or as trials which are split between jury
issues and bench issues.235 The judge has discretion to order a jury
trial in such qualifying cases even if no party has demanded it, and
the judge also has discretion to remove equitable issues from the jury
even when the claim as a whole has been docketed for a jury trial. 236
A trial judge in a legal action to pierce the veil has "wide discretion"
when determining whether to reserve equitable issues for a bench
trial.237

Under New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules, a party who
joins legal and equitable claims arising from the same transaction
waives the right to a jury trial on the legal claims.238 With no
guidance from the New York Court of Appeals, trial courts have
divided on whether a "claim" to pierce the corporate veil is equitable
and therefore destroys the right to a jury trial on the related legal
claims. In Klein v. Loeb Holding Corp., a New York trial court
determined that veil-piercing actions seeking to enforce a judgment
for money damages gave the claimant a right to a jury trial.239 In
First Keystone Consultants, Inc. v. DDR Construction Services, a
second trial court concluded that "[t]here is no right to a trial by jury

findings." (citing J.I. Case Credit Corp. v. Stark, 392 P.2d 215, 217 (Wash. 1964))).
234. Compare, e.g., Macaluso v. Jenkins, 420 N.E.2d 251, 253-58 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)
(upholding jury's veil-piercing conclusion), with Fontana v. TLD Builders, Inc., 840
N.E.2d 767, 771-72, 782-83 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (upholding the trial court's decision to
pierce the corporate veil after a bench trial), and Ted Harrison Oil Co. v. Dokka, 617
N.E.2d 898, 900, 902-03 (Il1. App. Ct. 1993) (upholding the trial court's decision to
pierce the corporate veil after a bench trial).
235. See OMV Assocs., L.P. v. Clearway Acquisition, Inc., 976 N.E.2d 185, 189-90
(Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (upholding a jury verdict after a jury trial on veil-piercing);
Cahaly v. Benistar Prop. Exch. Trust Co., 885 N.E.2d 800, 806 n.9 (Mass. App. Ct.
2008) (discussing how the procedural posture of the case included a jury trial on
liability and "a separate bench trial" on veil-piercing); Lily Transp. Corp. v. Royal
Institutional Servs., Inc., 832 N.E.2d 666, 669, 672-75 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (affirming
in part and reversing in part the lower court's bench trial which both found liability
and pierced the corporate veil).
236. See MAss. R. CIV. P. 39(b)-(c).
237. See Steele v. Kelley, 710 N.E.2d 973, 984 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999).
238. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4102(c) (McKinney 2014).
239. 878 N.Y.S.2d 876, 900-01, 905 (Sup. Ct. 2009).
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since piercing the corporate veil is an action that sounds in equity."240
Oklahoma maintains a similar "paramount-incidental" test for
equitable and legal claims whereby if equitable claims are
paramount in a given dispute, and legal claims only incidental, a
claimant enjoys no right to a jury trial.241 This is why, even though
Oklahoma law acknowledges veil-piercing as equitable,242 a party
may still obtain a jury determination for veil-piercing claims with
careful pleading. 2431ndeed, that is why a jury determination as to
veil-piercing could survive a challenge in one of Oklahoma's leading
veil-piercing cases.244 While Oklahoma courts may not grant a trial
by right in actions where the paramount issue is equitable in nature,
the court may "impanel[] a jury to advise it on questions of fact"245
although the ultimate decision remains with the trial judge.246
It is certainly true that in many jurisdictions, the law is simply
not clear. It is possible to identify cases that, in the same jurisdiction,
allow and reject the right to trial by jury, and/or the state's highest
court has not considered the issue.247 In Advanced Telephone
Systems, Inc. v. Com-Net Professional Mobile Radio, LLC, a
Pennsylvania court surveyed the inconsistency in Pennsylvania
decisions on the issue, although it concluded in that case that veilpiercing claims did not enjoy a right to a trial by jury.248 The Court of
Appeals of Iowa has held that the trial court "did not err [when it]
240. No. 270952005, 2008 WL 5431379, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 15, 2008) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
241. See Mooney v. Mooney, 70 P.3d. 872, 880 (Okla. 2003); see also Moschos v.
Bayless, 258 P. 263, 264 (Okla. 1927) (discussing how there was no right to a jury trial
where the controlling issue-whether the plaintiff had "a valid subsisting oil and gas
lease on" a certain piece of land-was equitable).
242. See Butcher v. McGinn, 706 P.2d 878, 879-80 (Okla. 1985).
243. See Russell v. Freeman, 214 P.2d 443, 444 (Okla. 1949) ("Where in an action
the paramount issue as formed by the pleadings is one of equitable cognizance ... said
action is an equitable action." (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
244. Gilbert v. Sec. Fin. Corp. of Okla., 152 P.3d 165, 175 (Okla. 2006).
245. Butcher, 706 P.2d at 880.
246. See id.; see also Moschos, 258 P. at 264. ("A jury may, in the discretion of the
court, be called upon to pass upon the issues, but in such case the jury could only act in
an advisory capacity. This issue as well as the relief sought is purely of equitable
cognizance.").
247. See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
248. 846 A.2d 1264, 1275-77 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004); see also Pearson v. Component
Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 484 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Courts have held veil.piercing to be
appropriate 'when the court must prevent fraud, illegality, or injustice, or when
recognition of the corporate entity would defeat public policy or shield someone from
liability for a crime[.]" (quoting Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1967)));
Patroski v. Ridge, No. 2:11-cv-1065, 2011 WL 4955274, at *2-4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 2011)
(noting that, while "Pennslyvania law ... recognize[s] piercing the corporate veil as an
independent cause of action," it also "features a strong presumption against the
propriety of piercing the corporate veil.").
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"instruct[ed] the jury on piercing the corporate veil."249 A Kansas
appellate court has concluded that questions regarding piercing the
corporate veil should be submitted to a jury where "there was
sufficient evidence contrary to the findings on which reasonable
minds might differ."250
E.Applicable Law
An important but revealing aspect of some empirical studies to
date is their preoccupation with the background competition between
states as potentially favorable jurisdictions for incorporators. Peter
Oh highlighted a Nevada corporate registration firm's advertisement
that Nevada courts were less likely to pierce than California's (they
back it up with a $100,000 guarantee) based on Thompson's
findings.251 Boyd and Hoffman noted a study which found that larger
companies avoided incorporating in a jurisdiction identified by
Thompson as having unfavorable veil-piercing law.252 These uses of
Thompson's study embed the same assumption that Thompson made
as well as Oh and others that followed: that states apply the
"internal affairs doctrine" in veil-piercing cases.253 That is, a court
will look to the law of the state of incorporation to determine whether
the veil should be pierced. The reality is different.
Robert Thompson and Peter Oh categorized court cases as
though the internal affairs doctrine applied.254 That is, if an Illinois
court applied Delaware veil-piercing law, that case was sorted as a
249. Spectrum Prosthetics & Orthotics, Inc. v. Baca Corp., 776 N.W.2d 302, at *4
(Iowa Ct. App. 2009). But see Briggs Transp. Co. v. Starr Sales Co., 262 N.W.2d 805,
808 (Iowa 1978) ("Trial was to the court. The court found Robert was a director and
officer of Starr Sales at all relevant times and participated in fraudulent activities.").
250. Serv. Iron Foundry, Inc. v. M.A. Bell Co., 588 P.2d 463, 475 (Kan. Ct. App.
1978). But see Sturkie v. Sifly, 313 S.E.2d 316, 318 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984) ("The role of
this Court on an appeal from an action in equity tried by a judge without a reference is
to determine the facts according to its view of the preponderance of the evidence.")
(citation omitted).
251. Oh, supra note 14, at 88 n.42 (citing Nevada vs. California, CORPORATE SERV.
CTR.,
INC.,
http://www.corporateservicecenter.com/our-services/nevada.
incorporation/nevada-vs-california]); The $100,000 Dollar Nevada Corporate Veil
Guarantee,CORPORATE SERV. CTR, INC., http://www.corporateservicecenter.com/aboutus/nevada-guarantee/.
252. Boyd & Hoffman, supra note 13, at 859 n.34 (citing Jens Dammann & Matthias
Schuindeln, The IncorporationChoices of PrivatelyHeld Corporations6-7 (Univ. of Tex.
Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 119, 2008)), available at
http://www.utexas.edulaw/wp/wpcontentluploads/centers/clbe/dammann_incorporation_choices of-privately-heldccorpo
rations.pdf.
253. McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 215-17 (Del. 1987). The doctrine "does
not apply where the rights of third parties external to the corporation are at issue, e.g.,
contracts and torts." VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d
1108, 1113 n.14 (Del. 2005).
254. See Oh, supranote 14, at 114.
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"Delaware" case for purposes of analysis.255 Relatedly, it was
assumed that the outcome of the case would be the same whether
litigated in Illinois or Delaware (or, for that matter, anywhere
else).256 McPherson and Raja reported data only for eight states and
while the phrasing of their discussion is not entirely clear, appear to
also sort cases by the law of the state of incorporation.257 Hodge and
Sachs did not break down data by state law or forum,258 and
Matheson only distinguished between state and federal courts and
9
between trial and appellate courts.25
To the extent they acknowledge the problem, all researchers
concede that not all states apply the internal affairs doctrine. Illinois
courts reliably apply the law of the state of incorporation,260 but
Tennessee courts mandate application of Tennessee veil-piercing
law.261 California and New York have asserted their ability to apply
their own corporate law to other states' corporations under certain
circumstances. 262 In Massachusetts, veil-piercing claims that seek to
reach out-of-state corporations, courts should generally apply the
substantive law of the state of incorporation to determine rights and
obligations related to "internal corporate affairs," but turn to
Massachusetts veil-piercing law to determine whether to reach the
corporations.263 A New Jersey trial court applied New Jersey veilpiercing law to a dispute in which two of three corporations were
incorporated elsewhere.264
Given the procedural variables outlined above, it is difficult to
justify sorting cases by substantive state law rather than the forum
that hosts the dispute. Even if Delaware substantive law applies to a
veil-piercing dispute in North Dakota, it is inevitable that the ease
255. See id. at 114-16.
256. See id.
257. See McPherson & Raja, supra note 12, at 948-49.
258. See Hodge & Sachs, supranote 12, at 347.
259. Matheson, supra note 12, at 17-18.
260. Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371,
378 (7th Cir. 2008); Retzler v. Pratt & Whitney Co., 723 N.E.2d 345, 354 (Ill. App. Ct.
1999).
261. Boles v. Nat'l Dev. Co., 175 S.W.3d 226, 236 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing
Oceanics Schools, Inc. v. Barbour, 112 S.W.3d 135 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)).
262. N.Y. BUS. Corp. LAW § 1317 (Consol. 2014); Serio v. Ardra Ins. Co., 761
N.Y.S.2d 1, 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); Sa'id Vakili, Corporations in Conflict: The
Potential for Conflicts of Interest in Shareholder Derivative Lawsuits Is High, Leading
to Complex Issue for Courts and Attorneys to Resolve, 35 L.A. LAW. 20, 22-23 (2012).
263. Cahaly v. Benistar Prop. Exch. Trust Co., 864 N.E.2d 548, 558 n.16 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2007), aff'd, 885 N.E.2d 800 (Mass. 2008). Contra Lily Transp. Corp. v. Royal
Institutional Servs., Inc., 832 N.E.2d 666, 674 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (concluding that
Pennsylvania law, not Massachusetts, should probably provide the veil piercing test,
but there was no basis to pierce under the law of either state).
264. D.R. Horton Inc.-N.J. v. Dynastar Dev., L.L.C., No. MER-L-1808-00, 2005 WL
1939778, at *19 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Aug. 10, 2005).
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with which veil-piercing actions are pled and the access claimants
enjoy to a jury would affect the outcome. Indeed, it is as likely that
those variables explain liberal veil-piercing in North Dakota as
"undercapitalization" as a stand-alone basis of substantive
liability.265 The use of substantive state law to identify "easy" versus
"difficult" piercing law similarly says nothing about applicable
evidentiary standards. Given that evidentiary standards reflect
specific social choices about allocating risk, the application of a
"clear-and-convincing" standard by a forum where the procedure of
the state of incorporation would apply only preponderance
legitimately calls into question fundamental democratic principles
and public policies.266
III. PROCEDURAL VARIABLES AFFECTING VEIL-PIERCING ACTIONS IN
FEDERAL COURTS

The majority of empirical studies of veil-piercing litigation to
date have considered not only outcomes in state courts - where the
procedural variables discussed above have been largely ignored - but
also in federal courts where the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) should theoretically bring uniformity over aspects of veilpiercing like pleading, form of action, and the right to a jury trial.267
Federal courts hear veil-piercing claims in two principal contexts:
when they are brought in disputes where state law is applicable
(diversity or supplemental jurisdiction) or under federal common
law.26s

Yet three aspects of federal jurisdiction exacerbate rather than
ameliorate veil-piercing's procedural complexity. First, within the
FRCP, federal district courts do not agree on which pleading
standards apply to veil-piercing claims. Second, under the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins and its
progeny, federal district courts sitting in diversity must apply both
the FRCP and substantive state law.269 Federal district courts must
therefore make a threshold decision as to whether veil-piercing is
"substantive" or "procedural" for purposes of identifying applicable
265.

Stephen Presser, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 2:38 (2014).

266. Gen. Signal Corp. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 66 F.3d 1500, 1506 (9th Cir. 1995)
(party asserting that New York's clear-and-convincing standard for fraud claims
violates California's public policy because California requires only preponderance).
267.

FED. R. CIV. P. 8, 38.

268. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012); United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63
n.9 (1998) (declining to discuss whether the state or federal alter ego doctrine applied
to determine derivative liability under CERCLA); Trustees of the Nat'l Elevator Indus.
Pension, Health Benefit & Educ. Funds v. Lutyk, 332 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2003); Mayes v.
Moore, 419 F. Supp. 2d 775, 780 (M.D.N.C. 2006) (applying federal common law
standard of veil piercing in Title VII action); FDIC v. United States, 654 F. Supp. 794,
809 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
269. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

1048

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1001

law. Third, under the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which has never been incorporated against the states - parties in
federal court enjoy a right to a jury in civil trials where the amount
in controversy exceeds twenty dollars.27o The U.S. Supreme Court

has determined that the Seventh Amendment's right to a jury trial
attaches for any claim that would have arisen under common law in
1791.271 Federal courts have not agreed on whether, if veil-piercing is
in fact procedural rather than substantive, parties would have
enjoyed a right to a jury trial on veil-piercing claims in 1791. Each of
these aspects of federal civil procedure, as well as the unclear content
of federal veil-piercing law, potentially affects existing veil-piercing
studies in significant ways.
A. Pleading
Federal district courts are divided as to whether a claim for
piercing the corporate veil must appear in written pleadings before
trial or in the pre-trial conference in order to be properly considered.
In PEMEX Exploracion y Produccion v. BASF Corp., a federal
district judge concluded that "[veil-piercing] theories must be
specifically pleaded or they are waived, unless they are tried by
consent."272 Other federal courts have rejected any standard greater
than minimal notice pleading for veil-piercing claims.273
Boyd and Hoffman assert that pleading of a piercing claim before
trial is the "majority rule" although it is not clear whether that is a
matter of federal or state procedure (they collect cases from both
federal and state courts) nor even how those cases represent one rule
or another.274 They cite Sudamax Industria e Comercia de Cigarros
270. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. A U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico has recently
declared that the Seventh Amendment jury trial right applies in state courts, but for a
number of reasons related to the procedural posture of the case, it is not clear whether
that declaration will go any further than the parties affected by it. Gonzalez-Oyarzun
v. Caribbean City Builders, Inc., No. 14-1101(GAG), 2014 WL 2885027, at *10-12
(D.P.R. June 25, 2014).
271. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 389 (1943).
272. PEMEX Exploraci6n y Producci6n v. BASF Corp., No. H-10-1997, 2013 WL
5514944, at *65 (S.D. Tex. 2013); see also Sunny Indus. Inc. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., No.
96-C-1020-C, 2002 WL 32345675, at *8-9 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 5, 2002); Quinn v. Workforce
2000, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 131, 135 (E.D. Tex. 1995); Levesque v. Kelly Commc'ns, Inc.,
No. 91 Civ. 7045 (CSH), 1993 WL 22113, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1993).
273. Lounge 22, L.L.C. v. Scales, 680 F. Supp. 2d 343, 346 (D. Mass. 2010); Kimsey
v. Akstein, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1302 n.14 (N.D. Ga. 2005) ("And, while Plaintiff did
not expressly include such a theory of liability in her Complaint, she did plead in her
Complaint, and Defendants admitted in their Answer and Amended Answer, that Dr.
Akstein is the President and CEO of the Eye Center, which is enough to have put
Defendants on notice that she may proceed on a theory of direct liability based on Dr.
Akstein's position at the Eye Center."); see also Dale v. H.B. Smith Co., 910 F. Supp.
14, 17 (D. Mass. 1995).
274. Boyd & Hoffman, supra note 13, at 878 n.121.
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Ltda. v. Buttes & Ashes, Inc. for the proposition that veil-piercing
must be pled275 even though that court considered the merits of veilpiercing allegation.276 They cite the Third Circuit's decision in Scully
v. U.S. Wats, Inc. for the proposition that veil-piercing is waived
when not pled,277 but that decision made no mention of waiver as a
sanction for failure to plead.278 Similarly, Boyd and Hoffman cite
Luyster v. Textron as supporting the majority rule279 even though
that court did not require the plaintiff to plead a veil-piercing theory,
only facts that supported the New York state veil-piercing
standard.280 Conversely, they cite Gill v. Byers Chevrolet LLC as
representative of the minority rule28l even though that court
appeared to require the plaintiff to meet the same pleading standard
as in Luyster.282 The point is that, even if Boyd and Hoffman are
correct that specific pleading of veil-piercing is the majority rule, the
minority is a significant one. The upshot is, as they correctly note,
"there may be two kinds of cases generally missing from our dataset:
failed attempts to add veil piercing claims in waiver jurisdictions and
successful attempts in lenient jurisdictions."283
B. Erie
In 1938, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled284 its long-standing
precedent, Swift v. Tyson, which held that federal courts exercising
diversity jurisdiction should apply state substantive law to state
claims, but narrowly construed the scope of applicable state law
while simultaneously implying broad common law making powers by
federal courts. 28 5 In Erie, the U.S. Supreme Court decided
conclusively that federal courts as courts of limited jurisdiction
enjoyed no general common law-making powers, and admonished
lower federal courts to apply not only state statutory law, as Swift v.
Tyson suggested, but also state common law developed by state
appellate courts. 28 6 Erie was decided the same year that the Federal

275. Id.
276. Sudamax Industria e Comercio de Cigarros, Ltda v. Buttes & Ashes, Inc., 516
F. Supp. 2d 841, 847-49 (W.D. Ky. 2007).
277. Boyd & Hoffman, supra note 13, at 878 n.121.
278. Scully v. U.S. Wats, Inc., 238 F.3d 497, 515-16 (3d Cir. 2001).
279. Boyd & Hoffman, supra note 13, at 878 n.121.
280. Luyster v. Textron, Inc., No. 06 CV 4166(LMM), 2007 WL 1792505, at *2-3
(S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2007).
281. Boyd & Hoffman, supra note 13, at 878 n.121.
282. Gill v. Byers Chevrolet L.L.C., No. C2:05-CV-982, 2006 WL 2460873, at *4-5
(S.D. Ohio, Aug. 23, 2006).
283. Boyd & Hoffman, supra note 13, at 878 n.121.
284. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938).
285. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842).
286. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-80.
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Rules of Civil Procedure displaced the Federal Equity Rules and the
Conformity Act,287 resulting in a system under which federal courts
applied the FRCP, which were less deferential to state civil
procedure, to disputes brought under diversity jurisdiction, which
newly required federal courts to take a broader view of applicable
state law. This procedure/substance divide continues to shape
litigation in federal courts, as their experience with state veilpiercing law amply demonstrates.288
To some extent the pleading discussion above is one aspect of the
way state law functions in federal courts. Whether or not a veilpiercing claim is waived if not specifically pled is arguably a function
of the law of waiver under either state substantive law or FRCP 8.289
In Allen v. United Properties& Construction., Inc., a Colorado federal
district court applied a Tenth Circuit case applying Colorado veilpiercing law, but concluded that "[Allen]'s allegations against Denver
Lending satisfy either Rule 8 or the Supreme Court's test in Bell
Atlantic Corp."290 Federal district courts addressing the issue imply
rather than explicitly address whether they are deciding as a matter
of the state law of waiver or federal pleading rules.291 In Gill v. Byers
Chevrolet L.L.C., for example, the federal district court applied preIqbal liberal pleading standards to a veil-piercing claim brought
under Ohio law.292 The court concluded that:
in order to successfully pierce the corporate veil, the plaintiff must
prove all of the [Ohio law] factors. However, the courts are not
entirely uniform regarding whether a plaintiff must specifically
allege in the amended complaint that defendant meets all of the...
criteria in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.293
The court then reviewed both state and federal court cases

287. 28 U.S.C. app. 741, References to Equity Rules.
288. See generally Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts:From Erie
and Klaxon to CAFA and Shady Grove, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (2012); Jay Tidmarsh,
Procedure, Substance, and Erie, 64 VAND. L. REV. 877 (2011).
289. Boyd & Hoffman, supra note 13, at 878 n.121 ("Second, one might imagine that
federal courts could, under Erie BR. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), treat the veil
piercing waiver rule as procedural, and thus trumped by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. However, our research discloses no examples of federal courts ignoring
state waiver rules on Erie grounds when analyzing state-based veil piercing claims.
Generally speaking, the application of Erie to state-based waiver standards, and
further to the scope of federal common law veil piercing, raises some serious and
interesting constitutional issues that are beyond the scope of this Article.").
290. Allen v. United Props. & Constr., No. 07-cv-00214-LTB-CBS, 2008 WL
4080035, at *12 (D. Colo. Sept. 3, 2008).
291. See, e.g., Lounge 22, L.L.C. v. Scales, 680 F. Supp. 2d 343, 346 (D. Mass. 2010).
292. Gill v. Byers Chevrolet L.L.C., No. C2:05-CV-982, 2006 WL 2460873, at *4-5
(S.D. Ohio Aug. 23, 2006).
293. Id. at *4.
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relevant to veil-piercing pleading.294 Although there is neither clarity
nor explication, it may very well be that federal courts are generally
concluding that there is no conflict between state and federal
pleading requirements and thus no Erie problem.
However, there is sufficient reason to doubt that federal courts
may reach that conclusion as uniformly as they appear to, or at least,
as uniformly as Boyd and Hoffman suggest they do. In the discussion
over pleading standards above, it is clear that state jurisdictions vary
from liberal notice pleading to heightened pleading standards and
even, for jurisdictions that require fraud, pleading with particularity.
Does FRCP 9(b) requiring that fraud be pled with particularity apply
to a veil-piercing claim where fraud is alleged as the "improper
purpose" prong of the typical three-part test? 295 Given that one
purpose of Erie was to preserve uniformity in the application of state
law, federal district courts should at least analyze state law in
considering motions brought under FRCP 12. If they are, the result,
like studies of state jurisdictions, may result in a disproportionate
number of cases (and, therefore "litigation events") from notice
pleading jurisdictions. That affects not only studies undertaken by
Thompson, Matheson, Oh and others, but also Boyd's and
Hoffman's.296 Given that each federal district court case produces
multiple "litigation events," that selection bias may result in more
heavily distorted results than studies that focus on outcomes only.
C. The Seventh Amendment and the Right to a Jury on VeilPiercingClaims
The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that the
right to a trial by jury "In Suits at common law ... shall be
preserved."297 Because of the wording of the amendment, analysis of
whether a party enjoys a right to a trial by jury in civil cases
generally proceeds from a historical inquiry as to whether that party
would have enjoyed a right to a jury trial in 1791.298 Federal district
courts sitting in diversity must therefore decide whether parties
seeking to pierce the corporate veil 1) obtain the right to a trial by

294. Id. at *5.
295. In Laugh Factory, Inc. v. Basciano, 608 F. Supp. 2d 549, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2009),
the district court judge applied the FRCP 9(b) pleading standard to the claim brought
under state law, but imposed New York's evidentiary standard.
296. In diversity cases, federal courts are obliged to apply state statutes of
limitations and state standards of proof. See Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York
326 U.S. 99 (1945) (statutes of limitations); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S.
208 (1939) (evidentiary standard).
297. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
298. Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) ("The right of
trial by jury . . . is the right which existed under the English common law when the
Amendment was adopted.").
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jury as a function of Erie or of the Seventh Amendment and 2) if the
Seventh Amendment, is an action for veil-piercing within the
common law suits available in 1791.
Federal courts are divided on these questions. 299 In
International Financial Services Corp. v. Chromas Technologies
Canada Inc., the Seventh Circuit concluded somewhat confusingly
that when "a district court is applying the substantive law of a state,
federal procedural law controls the question of whether there is a
right to a jury trial,"300 but hinged its conclusion - that veil-piercing

is equitable and therefore ineligible for a jury trial - on whether veilpiercing was an equitable remedy under Illinois law. ol Because
Illinois trial courts pierce the corporate veil as a matter of discretion
to avoid "injustice or inequity", the claim, the Seventh Circuit
reasoned, was equitable.3o2 The court asserted that "[p]iercing the
corporate veil, after all, is not itself an action; it is merely a
procedural means of allowing liability on a substantive claim, here
breach of contract."a0
The Seventh Circuit specifically rejected the Fifth Circuit's
holding in FMC FinancialCorporationv. Murphree, (applying Illinois
law) that the right to trial by jury was strictly an issue of federal
procedural law and that U.S. Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit
precedent favored jury resolution of veil-piercing claims.304 The FMC
court emphasized the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Electric Co-op, Inc. which ordered an issue of South Carolina
statutory law to be decided by a jury in diversity proceedings in a
federal district court, even though the Supreme Court of South
Carolina had decided the issue should be decided as a matter of law
by the state trial court.305 In Win. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v.
Resnick Developers South, Inc., the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
relied on not only its prior precedent and FMC, but also a historical
299. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 77,
79 n.14 (2005) (citing Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc.,
933 F.2d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 1991) (veil piercing has roots in both law and equity, so it
was proper for trial court to submit issue to jury); Am. Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo, 844
F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 1988) (veil piercing is an equitable remedy but issue is normally
submitted to a jury); United States v. Golden Acres, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 96, 103 (D. Del.
1988) (veil piercing is equitable remedy and affords no right to jury trial); Dow Jones
Co. v. Avenel, 198 Cal. Rptr. 457, 460 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (same); Bower v. Bunker
Hill Co., 675 F. Supp. 1254, 1261-62 (E.D. Wash. 1986) (veil piercing a legal remedy
because it seeks a money judgment and thus a right to jury trial exists)).
300. Int'l Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Chromas Techs. Can., Inc., 356 F.3d 731, 737 (7th Cir.
2004) (citing Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963)).
301. Id. at 739.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 736.
304. 632 F.2d 413, 421 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1980).
305. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop, Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 533-40 (1958).
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survey of veil-piercing in the English courts of law and equity.306
Under the Second Circuit's historical analysis, veil-piercing was most
analogous to actions to enforce a creditor's bill comprised of actions in
both the courts of equity and law. While the Second Circuit was not
explicit, it appeared to reach its conclusion as though federal
procedural law flowing from the Seventh Amendment controlled.
However, it made an additional finding not specifically tied to federal
or state law:
Moreover, as a practical matter separate from Seventh Amendment
considerations, whether or not those factors-discussed later in our
analysis-that will justify ignoring the corporate form and
imposing liability on affiliated corporations or shareholders are
present in a given case is the sort of determination usually made by
a jury because it is so fact specific.307
These decisions have splintered the lower federal courts outside
the Second, Fifth and Seventh Circuits.08 As with pleading and
evidentiary variables outlined above, current studies make no effort
to control for whether the existence of a jury right may 1) skew the
sample of cases or dockets or 2) correlate (and by extension
potentially explain) certain phenomena. Boyd's and Hoffman's
predictions as to judicial behavior, for example, make more sense in
cases where the district court 1) found veil-piercing to be equitable
and therefore within his or her discretion or 2) exercised his or her
control over a jury verdict by ordering a new trial or entering a
judgment as a matter of law.

306. Win. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 933 F.2d 131,
134-37 (2d Cir. 1991).
307. Id. at 137 (citation omitted).
308. See, e.g., Iantosca v. Benistar Admin. Servs., Inc., 843 F. Supp. 2d 148, 154 (D.
Mass. 2012) (finding a right to a jury trial in a claim to pierce the corporate veil to
enforce a monetary judgment, a legal remedy); In re Bonds Distrib. Co., Inc., No. 9752130C-7W, 98-6044, 2000 WL 33682815, at *8 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Nov. 15, 2010) ("The
weight of authority appears to recognize a right to jury trial with respect to claims
seeking to pierce the corporate veil based upon the theories of alter ego or mere
instrumentality. Although not entirely clear from the opinions, the courts in these
decisions apparently have concluded that where such claims seek to impose liability
upon the defendant for the debts or obligations of another, the remedy sought is
monetary damages and, hence, is legal in nature."); Cantiere DiPortovenere Piesse
S.p.A. v. Kerwin, 739 F. Supp. 231, 236 (E.D. Pa. 1990) ("Moreover, the weight of
authority in this area directly contradicts defendants' contention that it was improper
to submit the question of corporate disregard to the jury as courts regularly submit
this factual issue to the jury.") (citations omitted); United States v. Golden Acres, Inc.,
684 F. Supp. 96, 103 (D. Del. 1988) (applying Delaware law) ("Piercing the corporate
veil is an action that sounds in equity."). But see Lee Way Holding Co. v. Banner
Indus., Inc., 118 B.R. 544, 546-48 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) (rejecting the right to a jury
trial on a veil-piercing claim).
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INFLUENCE OF PROCEDURE

The rules of civil procedure and evidence inevitably influence the
choice as to whether to pursue a veil-piercing claim versus an
alternative; the incentives to settle all or part of a lawsuit; and,
whether or not a veil-piercing claim proceeds past a preliminary
point in litigation. Yet empirical studies to date either speculate as to
or explain certain veil-piercing phenomena as a result of substantive
state veil-piercing law and its constituent inquiries, especially those
related to control and "improper purpose." Many of those studies also
combine cases decided before and after 1938 - when the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted and then replicated by states even though those cases would have been adjudicated under
drastically different regimes.309
A. Alternative Theories of Recovery
Scholars have always known that veil-piercing claims are
litigation alternatives to other strategies which achieve the same
result: unification of shareholders and their corporations for a variety
of legal purposes. In jurisdictions with liberal pleading rules,
preponderance evidentiary standards and access to a jury, there may
be little reason to do more in the initial complaint or petition than
name both shareholders and their corporations, include general
allegations relevant to a state's veil-piercing elements, and perhaps
not even identify the theory by name. This would advance interests
in wide discovery requests as well as flexibility for crystallizing
issues for trial.
Where jurisdictions start to peel away those procedural
advantages, different strategies and causes of action will control the
course of litigation. Plaintiffs may pursue other legal theories to hold
a corporation's owners liable, and sometimes plead more than one
such theory in the same complaint when facts exist to support
another theory. Other legal theories which sometimes overlap with
veil piercing actions include agency liability,310 direct personal
liability for wrongs committed by corporate owners like fraudulent
transfer,311 and joint venture or enterprise liability between the
corporation and its corporate or individual shareholders.312 The
309. See Carl Tobias, The Past and Future of the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3
NEV. L.J. 400, 401-04 (2003) (discussing the deterioration of uniformity between state
and federal rules of civil procedure since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
310. E.g., Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Sport Maska, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 67, 72-73 (D.
Mass. 1992); Kincaid v. Landing Dev. Corp., 344 S.E.2d 869, 874 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986).
311. E.g., Ray-Tek Servs., Inc. v. Parker, 831 N.E.2d 948, 957-58 (Mass. App. Ct.
2005).
312. E.g., Gottlin v. Herzig, 662 N.E.2d 706, 711 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996); Green v.
Champion Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 249, 257-60 (La. Ct. App. 1991); see also James Dunne,
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Supreme Court of Oregon, in the same case it required veil-piercing
to be specifically pled, noted alternative theories by which corporate
creditors might recover from shareholders:
[Tiraditional agency and respondeat superior principles[,].., a
fraud form of action[,] . .. statutory remedies .... estoppel, quasi
contract, creditors' bill, and, finally, the theory that the
shareholder, by the shareholder's own conduct, has acted so as to
create direct liability as an actor by virtue of the shareholder's own
participation in the conduct which gave rise to the creditor's cause
of action.313
In jurisdictions which take a view that veil-piercing is an
equitable remedy, claimants may be forced to exhaust other theories
before allowing a veil-piercing claim to proceed.314 Moreover, in cases
where more than one theory is submitted to a jury, an appellate court
may affirm if there is sufficient evidence to affirm any theory of
recovery.3 15 In their study of veil-piercing cases in Texas, Hamilton,
Miller, and Ragazzo found that many cases in which veil-piercing
had been invoked were actually pedestrian agency cases.16 In
Garrett v. Albright, for example, a federal district court initially
granted summary judgment to a corporate parent under a veilpiercing theory controlled by an Eighth Circuit precedent
interpreting federal veil-piercing law, but then later made that
parent's assets available to the plaintiffs under a Missouri state
statute that made the parent responsible for the subsidiary's
actions.317
These alternative theories and their use necessarily affect
depictions of the "ease" of state veil-piercing laws and the inquiries
embedded within those laws even within the cases caught by most
database searches. For example, both Thompson and Oh note that
Delaware produces few veil-piercing cases given the number of close

Taking the Entergy Out of Louisiana's Single Business Enterprise Theory, 69 LA. L.
REV. 691, 697-98 (2009); GLENN G. MORRIS & WENDELL H. HOLMES, 8 LOUISIANA CIVIL
LAw TREATISE: BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 32.02 (2014). Since Green, it has only been
allowed in the First Circuit of Louisiana.
313. Amfac Foods, Inc. v. Int'l Sys. & Controls Corp., 654 P.2d 1092, 1098 (Or.
1982).
314. See, e.g., Graham v. Mimms, 444 N.E.2d 549, 561 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
315. See, e.g., Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co. v. Checker's, Inc., 754 F.2d 10, 14 (1st
Cir. 1985) ("While the jury's verdict did not disclose the precise theory on which the
jury held the defendants other than Checkers liable, we conclude there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to have determined that Checkers, Bentley, and Chips were run
as a single enterprise for the personal benefit of Patricia and Randolph.").
316.

ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., 20 TEXAS PRACTICE: BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §

26.12 (2d ed.).
317. Garrett v. Albright, No. 4:06-CV-4137-NKL, 2008 WL 268993, at *1-3 (W.D.
Mo. Jan. 30, 2008).
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corporations that choose it as governing law.318 But that is just as
easily explained by the special jurisdiction of Delaware Courts of
Chancery which would almost always hear veil-piercing claims, even
if the related litigation occurred in its courts of law.319 The incentive
for at least some litigants would be to find alternative theories under
which to merge shareholders and corporations.320 Outside Delaware's
courts, there is no obvious reason to believe that procedural variables
will not affect outcomes even when courts apply the same veilpiercing test. Lower federal courts, for example, disagree as to
whether Delaware requires a preponderance or heightened burden of
proof.321

B. ProceduralExplanationsfor Veil-Piercing Phenomena
Current
veil-piercing
studies
overwhelmingly
explain
phenomena in terms of substantive state veil-piercing law. Thompson
writes, for example, that "[k]nowledge of the differences between
state approaches will probably be of greater use to prospective
plaintiffs, who, given a choice, would rather file in a state whose
results are more inclined to piercing."22 Peter Oh notes that "Ohio's
55.87% veil-piercing rate is considerably simpler to explain, as courts
apply a fairly liberal standard that does not require proof of actual or
constructive fraud."323 He similarly argues that, when applying New
York law, the difference between federal courts' relatively high veilpiercing rates and New York state courts' relatively low veil-piercing
rate is explained by the difference in the tests they use.324

318. Thompson, supra note 12, at 1052-53; Oh, supra note 12, at 116.
319. See Cornell Glasgow, LLC v. LaGrange Props., LLC, No. N11C-07-160-JRS
CCLD, 2012 WL 6840625, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2012) ("As the litigation
progressed, both parties pressed certain equitable claims (e.g. rescission and piercing
the corporate veil) and, at various times, requested this judge to seek pro tern
appointment as a Vice Chancellor so that these claims could be litigated alongside the
law claims. The Court declined. Rather, the Court severed the equity claims and
stayed them pending resolution of the law claims.").
320. See, e.g., Rays Plumbing & Heating Serv., Inc. v. Stover Homes, L.L.C., C.A.
No. K10C-02-022 WLW, 2011 WL 3329384, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. July 26, 2011) ("A
subcontractor may seek an equitable remedy for breach of trust, or breach of contract.
Alternatively, a subcontractor may bring an action for fraud against a contractor's
agent-as Plaintiff has done in this case.").
321. Compare In re Foxmeyer Corp., 290 B.R. 229, 237 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003)
(asserting that Delaware law requires more than preponderance of the evidence), with
ASARCO LLC v. Ams. Mining Corp., 396 B.R. 278, 317 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008)
(applying preponderance standard under Delaware law).
322. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, supra note 12, at
1054.
323. Oh, supra note 12, at 120. This standard was modified in Dombroski v.
WellPoint, Inc., 895 N.E.2d 538, 545 (Ohio 2008) (requiring fraud, illegality or a
similarly unlawful act to justify piercing the corporate veil).
324. Oh, supra note 12, at 120.
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Introducing the background to his study, John Matheson predicts
that "one would expect that any common law doctrine should be
applied by the courts in a neutral manner, that is, evenhandedly
except for variations in factors explicitly and specifically identified as

part of the applicable test."325
But each of these explanations, taken as representative of
empirical studies as a whole, is equally explicable by reference to
applicable rules of civil procedure. Parties seeking to pierce the
corporate veil, especially those represented by shrewd attorneys, are
more likely to look for jurisdictions which allow the right mix of
notice pleading of veil-piercing claims, flexibility to bring those
claims toward the beginning of litigation, application (or not) of the
internal affairs doctrine in veil-piercing cases, preponderance of the
evidence standard, and access to a jury. These factors may have
nothing at all to do with which variation of the Powell or Fletcher
test states have adopted. Correspondingly, Ohio's relatively high veilpiercing rate may have more to do with its notice pleading standards,
preponderance standard,326 and access to a jury.327 This is all the
more likely given that substantive Ohio veil-piercing law has been
particularly volatile over the period studied by Thompson, Oh, and
others. 328 Federal and state courts applying New York law may be
using different tests - although it is not clear that this is so - but
substantive law aside, in New York state courts, veil-piercing is not
generally available at the beginning of litigation; it is held to a
heightened pleading standard, a heightened proof standard, and the
right of a claimant to a jury is both uncertain and fragile depending
on the other claims to which it is tied. There is therefore nothing
about Matheson's study that necessarily implicates the hypothesis he
advances. Two judges applying the same common law test in two
different jurisdictions may arrive at different conclusions not because
of differences in competence, integrity, or "neutrality," but simply

325. Matheson, supra note 12, at 4.
326. See Byars v. Herman, No. 83496, 2004 WL 1532224, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. July
8, 2004).
327. Stewart v. R.A. Eberts Co., No. 08CA10, 2009 WL 2684497, at *3 (Ohio Ct.
App. Aug. 18, 2009).
328. Ohio veil-piercing doctrine has vacillated between a relatively lenient standard
set out in the Belvedere case and then changed-although some say "muddied"--by the
Dombroski case, which resurrected a standard set out by the Supreme Court in
Bucyrus-Erie. Under current Ohio law, a plaintiff may only pierce the corporate veil
where the corporation was used to perpetrate a fraud or illegal act; a lesser legal duty
is insufficient. Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 545 (requiring fraud, illegality or a similarly
unlawful act to justify piercing the corporate veil); Belvedere Condo. Unit Owners'
Ass'n v. R.E. Roark Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1075, 1086 (Ohio 1993) ("Mhe corporate form
may be disregarded when '. . . domination and control was used to commit fraud or
wrong or other dishonest or unjust act .... "' (quoting Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Gen. Prods.
Corp., 643 F.2d 413, 418 (6th Cir. 1981))).

1058

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1001

because the rules of procedure and evidence under which they
adjudicate lead to those conclusions.
There is a sufficiently large literature doubting the possibility of
neutrally applied rules that there is no need to veer into that
discussion here.329 It is enough to say that purely from an empirical
perspective, the procedural variables outlined above may
independently explain phenomena that researchers tie to substantive
state law and constituent inquiries related to control and improper
corporate purpose. Boyd and Hoffman are the least guilty of this
neglect. By studying only the dockets of federal district courts, they
necessarily embed fewer procedural differences than studies which
aggregate both state and federal cases. They even go further by
examining corporate size and the personal profile of judges. In this
respect, theirs is the most skeptical study as to the effect of
substantive state or federal common law of veil-piercing. They write:
"In summary, legal realism tempers the ambition of empirically
based studies of litigation. It discounts the likelihood that the formal
rules of law are doing their perceived work in molding the resolution
of disputes."330
But Boyd's and Hoffman's study is not only limited by its scope it can only tell us about what happens in federal courts where a
minority of veil-piercing litigation occurs - but also by procedural
variables. They concede that they do not control for the differing
pleading standards adopted by federal district courts which may
affect their sample size and therefore their outcomes. More
significantly, they do not control for the availability of jury trials in
the dockets they study which may not only affect the overall course of
the litigation, but may also be relevant to whether a judge, rather
than a jury, "pierces" for purposes of their analysis of judicial
behavior.
V. CONCLUSION

This Article has made two central arguments. The first is that
current empirical studies of veil-piercing cases fail to control for
procedural and evidentiary variables, and analysts need to do a
better job of comparing apples to apples in veil-piercing cases. Cases
in which veil-piercing is brought toward the beginning of litigation,
subjected to liberal pleading standards, held to a lower or higher
evidentiary burden, or submitted to a jury for determination will
necessarily affect case outcomes. By bundling together cases across
jurisdictions and court levels (trial, appellate, supreme), current

329. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Socy REV. 95 (1975); Duncan Kennedy, Form
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
330. Boyd & Hoffman, supra note 13, at 875.
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studies strip away too much relevant information about what
actually happens in veil-piercing litigation.
Second, I have argued that rules of civil procedure and evidence
may independently explain phenomena that current studies tie to
substantive federal and state law tests. While Stephen Presser and
Peter Oh associate North Dakota's high veil-piercing rate with its
attitude toward "undercapitalization" as a legal basis to pierce, it
may be just as likely that its liberal pleading standards, lower
burden of proof, and access to a jury on veil-piercing claims matter
more. Researchers should be sensitive to other procedural influences,
like statutes of limitations and res judicata, which may shape how
and why veil-piercing is chosen over alternative theories that unify
shareholders and corporations.
The main implication is that empirically-oriented veil-piercing
analysts should take more care to define their principal behavior of
interest and to ensure that measures of that behavior adequately
adhere to the context in which that behavior occurs. Most scholars
are generally not focused on veil-piercing because they are interested
in Powell's three-part test; they are interested in veil-piercing as a
measure of the extent to which state and federal judges respect the
separation between shareholders and their corporations. Collecting
cases and sorting them or their internal criteria as an index of
judicial behavior is not sufficient. Including procedural variables is
relevant for the same reasons the rules are always important: they
necessarily entail distributive effects. The trend toward more
stringent application of veil-piercing, which many scholars
acknowledge, may be as much firms playing for the rules as
legislators or judges adopting a more sympathetic posture toward
limited liability entities.
This Article has not, of course, demonstrated as an empirical
matter that the associations drawn by existing empirical studies of
veil-piercing might not resurface if researchers controlled for
procedural and evidentiary differences. Instead of such a
demonstration, which involves a larger research project than may be
offered here, there are two research trajectories worth considering.
First, within any given jurisdiction, researchers may test the various
theories by which shareholders and corporations are unified for
purposes of legal liabilities-including agency, joint venture,
enterprise liability, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting-as a better
measure of whether judges in a particular state respect shareholdercorporate separation. Second, scholars may eschew the use of
admittedly subjective case sorting methods or multivariate
regression analyses for the less exciting but arguably more fitting
approach of case studies and surveys of how and why veil-piercing
law and procedure have adapted as they have in response to changes
in both state corporation codes and state rules of civil procedure.
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Peter Oh has already made one step in this direction; tracing the
history of veil-piercing, arguing as a historical matter that it was an
equitable remedy, and urging a return to its roots.3S1 He may be
correct as a historical and normative matter. But it is worth
considering that as the fundamental bargain for limited liability
between society and entrepreneurs has democratized and
corporations rapidly assume the character and legal form as all other
citizens, it is entirely reasonable that procedure and law adapt to fit
that reality.

331.

Oh, Veil Piercing Unbound, supra note 44, at 89.

